# When a Search Is Only a Form, and When No Search Is Held: Mechanisms in Faculty Hiring

- Author: Shuichiro Ogawa (Design Researcher / Design Consultant), https://jamjet-iqbal.com/
- Published: 2026-08-22; updated: 2026-08-22
- Canonical (HTML): https://jamjet-iqbal.com/en/notes/predetermined-faculty-hiring-mechanisms/
- Japanese version: https://jamjet-iqbal.com/notes/predetermined-faculty-hiring-mechanisms/ (Markdown: https://jamjet-iqbal.com/notes/predetermined-faculty-hiring-mechanisms.md)
- Language: en
- Keywords: faculty-hiring, academic-labor-market, institutional-decoupling, social-closure, referral-hiring, recruitment-channel-choice, legal-endogeneity, search-committee, higher-education, literature-review

> A literature map of predetermined faculty searches that deliberately sets prevalence aside and takes up only the generating mechanisms, organized from 210 academic sources across five strands: organization theory and institutionalism, social closure, the economics of recruitment-channel choice, university institutional history, and law plus search-committee evidence. The question splits in two: why an advertised search has a settled outcome (hollowing), and why no search is held at all (avoidance). Eleven mechanisms are set out for the first and fifteen for the second, each with its theoretical source, supporting evidence, and counter-evidence. The word for open competition appears nowhere in the five governing Japanese statutes; the highest authority for a search requirement is a 2001 cabinet decision. Counter-evidence that non-search hiring is efficient was collected too, but hiring internally and skipping the posting are separable, and isolating the latter makes outcomes worse.

> A literature map of predetermined faculty searches covering **only the generating mechanisms**, built from **210 academic sources** through a lightweight scoping review.
> The sister note [Predetermined Faculty Searches: Prevalence and Causes](https://jamjet-iqbal.com/en/notes/predetermined-faculty-hiring-literature/) covers **prevalence**. This one covers **mechanisms**. The 63 items collected there are not re-collected here; where they are needed, their existing ids (th03, en01, and so on) are cited instead.
> The internal corpus with the provenance ledger is at `source/review/predetermined-faculty-hiring-mechanisms/papers.md` (repository-internal, not published). Full bibliographic details for every source appear under "References" below.
> For the general account of how evaluation accumulates advantage, see the critique of meritocratic evaluation (private).
> Collection was divided into five non-overlapping strands run in parallel, under a protocol of zero fabrication and provenance tracking.

## Last Time the Question Was How Many. This Time It Is Not

The sister note asked what share of advertised searches are decided in advance, and established that no answer exists in the literature. In its place it assembled proxies (self-hire rates, the share of hires made without a search) and closed with a list of seven causes.

That list has a defect. Each cause names a theory and stops there. What the theory became over the following forty years, who attacked it, and what evidence supported it are all absent. Meyer and Rowan's decoupling appears as the title of a 1977 article; Doeringer and Piore's internal labor markets appear as the title of a 1971 book. Nothing follows.

There is a second and larger defect. The seven mechanisms mix answers to two quite different questions.

## Splitting the Question

**Q1 (hollowing)** asks why an advertised search has an outcome that is settled in advance. It concerns the mechanisms by which the form of open competition becomes detached from its substance.

**Q2 (avoidance)** asks why the form of open competition is not chosen in the first place. It concerns the mechanisms by which non-search pathways (promotion, direct appointment, succession, waivers, invited appointments) are selected, treated as a question of employer rationality.

This is not a verbal distinction. The two differ in how they can be detected: Q2 is measurable by comparing written policy against hiring records, while Q1 is not measurable from records of completed procedure. They also differ in what would address them: publishing usage rates for each pathway makes Q2 visible, whereas holding more searches does nothing for Q1.

The distinction has a theoretical basis. Bromley and Powell (2012, a01) separate **policy-practice decoupling** (a gap between stated policy and practice) from **means-ends decoupling** (a gap between practice and purpose). Holding a search policy while not running searches is the former, which is Q2. Running the search while the selection lacks substance is the latter, which is Q1. They argue that the latter is the less studied of the two, and that under means-ends decoupling the activity becomes hard to monitor, so the organization enters an endless cycle of reform.

Q2, moreover, is not peculiar to universities. Every employer chooses between advertising a post and approaching someone already known. Research on that choice is deep in labor economics and personnel research, and the mechanisms cannot be explained by looking at universities alone. That is why the economics of recruitment-channel choice was set up as an independent strand here, and why all 210 items carry a judgement of whether they are university-specific or shared with the general labor market.

## Q1 Mechanisms: The Search Is Open, the Outcome Is Not

Each mechanism is set out with the same five fields: theoretical source, expected effect, supporting evidence, counter-evidence or limits, and scope.

**Q1-1 The procedure runs but does not connect to its purpose**
Source: Bromley and Powell's means-ends decoupling (a01); Meyer and Rowan (existing th03).
Expected effect: the posting, the paper screening, and the interviews all take place, but the sequence is not connected to the purpose of selecting the best candidate. Anyone monitoring observes only that the procedure was completed, so the disconnection is undetectable.
Supporting evidence: MacLean and Behnam (a10) show that decoupling a compliance regime from core operations produces a "legitimacy facade" that in turn enables institutionalized misconduct. Herschberg and colleagues (e55) measure the gap between the criteria written into the advertisement and those actually applied, across Europe.
Counter-evidence or limits: Wijen (a12) argues that in opaque fields procedural compliance and goal achievement stand in a trade-off, formalized as the proposition that the higher the field's opacity, the less likely a compliance-oriented institution is to achieve the goals its initiators set; the conclusion is that enforcing compliance can itself undermine goal achievement, so remedying decoupling may move the goal further away. Haack and colleagues (a40) go further, testing in a formal model the premise that greater transparency pushes organizations toward substantive adoption, and showing that letting organizations adopt ceremonially under opacity first and shifting to transparency afterwards can raise the share of substantive adoptions. Sauder and Espeland (a36) identify conditions under which buffering fails and coupling tightens.
Scope: general. That said, the line of work following Weick (a02) positions educational organizations as a form especially prone to loose coupling.

**Q1-2 The law demands procedure rather than outcome, and the procedure's existence becomes the proof of fairness**
Source: Edelman (1992, e08) and Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger (1999, e09) on **legal endogeneity**.
Expected effect: because the law does not specify what compliance consists of, organizations invent it. Searches, job descriptions, rubrics, diversity statements, and search reports are the products. Courts then absorb the existence of those procedures into the standard of fairness, so legitimacy is supplied without the substance being examined.
Supporting evidence: Edelman and colleagues (e10) show through quantitative analysis of judgements that courts accept the existence of a procedure as evidence of compliance without testing its substance. Krieger and colleagues (e12) show the consequence: plaintiffs are less likely to prevail against organizations equipped with "best practices." Bisom-Rapp (e13) describes the practice by which search records are designed as litigation-defense artifacts rather than records of selection.
Counter-evidence or limits: Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly (e15), using a panel of 708 establishments, find that bureaucratizing procedure barely moves managerial diversity and that only measures establishing accountability have broad effects. Bradley and colleagues (e71) find that establishing a chief diversity officer does not change the racial composition of faculty hires. Documentation requirements may be a necessary condition for hollowing, but they are not sufficient.
Scope: general, but strongly specific to the United States. Japan has no legal source that produces this chain.

**Q1-3 Rejected applicants are satisfied anyway (the fair process effect)**
Source: the procedural justice tradition beginning with Thibaut and Walker (a20), running through Leventhal (a21) and Lind and Tyler (a22), and applied to personnel selection by Gilliland (a26).
Expected effect: an applicant observes only the outcome of their own rejection. The evaluation of other candidates and the internal workings of the selection are invisible. This condition is structurally identical to the experimental setup in van den Bos and colleagues (a24). Under it, whether the procedure looks fair governs acceptance.
Supporting evidence: Brockner and Wiesenfeld (a25), reviewing 45 independent samples, find an interaction whereby **the less fair or less desirable the outcome, the stronger the positive relationship between procedural fairness and the person's reaction**. Hausknecht and colleagues (a27), in a meta-analysis of 86 samples with N=48,750, find face validity to be a strong predictor of these perceptions. Folger and colleagues (a23) isolate experimentally the conditions under which the opportunity to voice an opinion raises satisfaction independently of the outcome.
Counter-evidence or limits: Truxillo and colleagues (a28) argue that the boundary conditions under which fairness substantively matters are narrower than often assumed.
Scope: general. **No study measuring this effect in university faculty searches was found.**

Accordingly, that rejected applicants do not object is no evidence that the search had substance. If anything, the worse the outcome for them, the more readily acceptance is produced by the appearance of the procedure alone.

**Q1-4 Proclaiming fairness loosens judgement**
Source: Castilla and Benard (e72) on the paradox of meritocracy; van den Brink and colleagues (e51) on the paradox of transparency.
Expected effect: the more explicitly an organization proclaims itself meritocratic, the more its evaluators believe themselves fair while judging in biased ways.
Supporting evidence: the several experiments in Castilla and Benard. Van den Brink and colleagues, drawing on 971 professorial appointment reports, seven selection protocols, and interviews with 64 committee members in the Netherlands, find that rules demanding transparency and accountability produce "bounded transparency and limited accountability at best."
Counter-evidence or limits: Culpepper and colleagues (e60) show that rubrics reduce some bias while also serving, depending on use, to ratify existing preferences.
Scope: general experimental evidence (e72) with confirmation in a university setting (e51).

Q1-3 and Q1-4 point in opposite directions but are compatible. The first is a mechanism operating on the receiving side, the second on the deciding side. The same "procedure that looks fair" acts separately on each.

**Q1-5 Criteria are written after the fact to fit the candidate**
Source: van den Brink and Benschop (e52) on the "sheep with five legs"; Hamann (d62) on the twin mechanisms of judgement and legitimation.
Expected effect: the candidate is settled first, and the criteria are written to justify the person selected. The appointment report is not a record of selection but a document that constructs excellence retrospectively.
Supporting evidence: Hamann analyzes 145 professorial appointment procedures at 16 German universities together with over 1,500 archival documents from 1950 to 1985. The gap between formal and applied criteria in Herschberg and colleagues (e55), the collective construction of competitiveness in White-Lewis and colleagues (e61), and fit in existing en01 all point at the same mechanism. Yamanoi (d17) attempted a matching analysis of advertisement text against the attributes of the person hired in Japan, using advertisements from 1975 to 1992.
Counter-evidence or limits: all of these are qualitative and none measures frequency. Reymert (d64), analyzing confidential assessment reports at the University of Oslo, concludes that bibliometric indicators are used substantively as a screening tool. Hamann's sources end in 1985, so extrapolation to the present requires verification.
Scope: university-specific, though Rivera (b35, b36) shows the same form in elite professional service firms.

The sharpest collision in this map sits here. The act that van den Brink and Benschop describe critically as writing conditions to fit the candidate is derived by Chan (c37) as optimal design: handicapping external candidates to favor internal ones can be optimal for preserving insiders' effort incentives. What sociology calls hollowing, contract theory calls an optimal contract. And the United States PERM special handling provision for university teachers (existing th09), by allowing the application within eighteen months after selection, legally permits a pro forma posting made after the successful candidate is settled. Criticism, optimization, and legal permission all point at the same act.

**Q1-6 As posting costs fall, postings made for their own sake increase**
Source: Autor (c25): the electronic distribution of job information cuts recruitment costs dramatically while shifting the screening burden onto the employer.
Expected effect: the cheaper posting becomes, the stronger the incentive to post irrespective of any substantive selection. The free and easy posting offered by JREC-IN is the relevant case.
Supporting evidence: Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (c21) show from JOLTS establishment data that employers use recruitment instruments other than vacancies, so posting counts and actual recruiting effort diverge. Casella and Hanaki (c12) theorize why referral hiring does not disappear even as the cost of the formal channel falls.
Counter-evidence or limits: there is no direct test in a university setting. Application to Japan remains a hypothesis.
Scope: general.

**Q1-7 Prestige substitutes for judgement**
Source: Podolny (b38) on status-based market models; Phelps (c07) and Arrow (c08) on statistical discrimination; Merton (b18, b19) on cumulative advantage.
Expected effect: where quality is hard to observe, using the prestige of the candidate's institution as a proxy becomes rational in terms of information costs. Past recognition substitutes for predicting future performance, so choosing an already established candidate passes as rational inference rather than as a shortcut.
Supporting evidence: Burris (b22) derives institutional prestige from PhD exchange networks, and existing en11 and en12 (Clauset and colleagues) scale that up. Bol and colleagues (b24) identify cumulative advantage using the funding threshold. Way and colleagues (b27) show that institutional environment affects productivity, which is evidence on the side of prestige carrying information.
Counter-evidence or limits: Lynn and colleagues (b39) specify conditions under which status and quality diverge. Zhang and colleagues (b28) argue that the productivity advantage of elite institutions is explained by available labor rather than ability. Azoulay and colleagues (b25) question whether the Matthew effect exists at all.
Scope: general theory with university-specific evidence attached.

**Q1-8 Silence in committee ratifies the settled consensus**
Source: Liera (e58) on the culture of niceness; Waters (b13) on collegiality.
Expected effect: a norm against voicing dissent turns the committee meeting into a ratification of a consensus formed beforehand.
Supporting evidence: existing en08; O'Meara and colleagues (e59), who decompose hiring into a chain of decisions and show that the default at each stage governs the outcome.
Counter-evidence or limits: the multisite cluster RCT of Carnes and colleagues (e63); the random assignment of committee members in Bagues and colleagues (e65), which finds that raising the share of women on committees does not improve women candidates' success rates; and the conditional rubric effects in Culpepper and colleagues (e60).
Scope: university-specific evidence with general theory attached.

**Q1-9 The later the adopter, the more it takes the form alone**
Source: Tolbert and Zucker (a05); Westphal and Zajac (a06).
Expected effect: organizations that adopt open competition after it has become established as a legitimate form adopt it for legitimacy rather than internal need, and the substance does not follow.
Supporting evidence: Tolbert and Zucker analyze the diffusion of municipal civil service procedures (appointment by competitive examination) and show that **city characteristics predict adoption among early adopters but no longer predict it among later adopters, where only the institutional definition of a legitimate structural form remains**. This is the prototype of empirical work on the formalization of selection procedure itself. Westphal and Zajac, over twenty years and 570 large US firms, find a substantial number that adopt long-term incentive plans without using them.
Counter-evidence or limits: the early-versus-late difference in Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell (a08) was not confirmed in the text.
Scope: general. The decline in Japan reported in existing jp07 (from 31.2% in 1975 to 14.8% in 1992) invites this staged hypothesis, but no study has applied it.

**Q1-10 University decisions are justified after the fact**
Source: Cohen, March, and Olsen (a29) on the garbage can model; Cohen and March (a30); Birnbaum (a31).
Expected effect: in organizations with ambiguous goals and fluid participation, decisions arise from the confluence of elements flowing into a choice opportunity rather than by deduction from prior criteria. Selection criteria are tidied up after the decision.
Supporting evidence: none directly in this map. Existing en02 (position requirements narrowed at the definition stage before the advertisement) is the closest.
Counter-evidence or limits: Hallett (a37), in a two-year ethnography of an urban elementary school, documents **recoupling**, in which loosely coupled myth and practice become tightly bound. Coburn (a38) and Sauder and Espeland (a36) also identify conditions under which loose coupling in educational organizations tightens. "Universities are always loose" does not hold. Further, all three of a29 through a31 are unconfirmed in the text, making this the thinnest-evidenced mechanism here.
Scope: university-specific.

**Q1-11 The value of the policy-practice versus means-ends distinction itself**
Source: a01.
Expected effect: the two have travelled under the single word "decoupling," yet they differ in both detection and remedy.
Supporting evidence: a06 and a07 are measurement instances of the policy-practice type; e51, e52, and d62 of the means-ends type.
Counter-evidence or limits: the distinction has not yet been applied empirically to university faculty hiring.
Scope: general.

## Q2 Mechanisms: No Search Is Held in the First Place

**Q2-1 Japanese law does not require an open search**
Source: Article 3 of the Special Act on Education Public Service Personnel (d01, e20), Article 93 of the School Education Act (d02), the Standards for the Establishment of Universities (d03), the Fixed-Term Appointment Act (d04), and the National University Corporation Act (d05). All verified verbatim through the e-Gov statute API.
Expected effect: Article 3(1) requires that "the appointment and promotion of teaching staff shall be by selection" (*senkō*), not by open competition. **The word for open competition (*kōbo*) appears nowhere in any of these five statutes.** Promotion and direct appointment are therefore not unlawful. This contrasts sharply with Article 36 of the National Public Service Act ("the appointment of officials shall be by competitive examination") and Article 18-2 of the Local Public Service Act, which mandates that examinations be open (e21); university teaching staff are carved out of that principle. Corporatization in 2004 removed even the "selection" rule of the Special Act from national university faculty.
Supporting evidence: existing jp01 (Tokyo Metropolitan University, AY2021: of 23 professorial appointments, five came through an open search).
Counter-evidence or limits: that the law does not forbid something is distinct from its actually being chosen. The reasons it is chosen are handled by Q2-3 onward. No study was found on what the internal rules of individual corporations actually specify (d24).
Scope: university-specific and Japan-specific.

The highest authority requiring open searches in Japan is not a statute. The Second Science and Technology Basic Plan, a 2001 cabinet decision, states that "for positions engaged in research, national research institutes, incorporated administrative research agencies, national universities and other national research organizations shall in principle use open recruitment, providing fair employment opportunity broadly to researchers with the ability and capability" (d06). Posting to JREC-IN is likewise not an obligation; JST itself states that "the support for job offers and job seeking in this service consists of the provision of information and does not constitute placement services" (d07).

**Q2-2 In the Anglophone world and Germany, waivers are codified as explicit exceptions**
Source: UC Berkeley's search waiver (d58), the four exemption categories in UW-5008 (d59), Article 66 of the Bavarian BayHIG (d61), Section 45 of the German federal HRG (d60), and the US PERM special handling provision (existing th09).
Expected effect: because an official route around the search exists, what is chosen is not a hollow search but no search at all.
Supporting evidence: Smith and colleagues (e62) document how special appointments that interrupt the usual search are used; van den Brink (e54) shows that in professorial appointments in Dutch academic medicine, recruitment by invitation from male scouts is the dominant pattern. Existing en13, en14, en16, and en19 cover the same routes.
Counter-evidence or limits: no official statistics on usage rates exist even in the United States (existing nw04). Culpepper and colleagues (d57) show that search waivers are also deliberately designed instruments for diversity goals, which refutes the single-track account of the waiver as a back door.
Scope: university-specific.

UC Berkeley states the basis of its own search requirement plainly: "By conducting open searches to fill the majority of new or vacant academic positions, the University fulfills federal and state equal employment opportunity requirements." This wording from the university itself indicates that the search is positioned as a device for demonstrating legal compliance before it is an instrument for finding candidates.

Germany sits at the opposite pole. Section 45 of the HRG requires by statute that professorial positions "be advertised publicly and, as a rule, internationally," while allowing state law to provide exceptions. Article 66(7) of the BayHIG enumerates in statutory text three categories in which appointment without an advertisement is permitted (converting a fixed-term professorship to a permanent one, promoting a junior professor, and direct appointment of an outstanding candidate), and Article 66(8) permits an excellence appointment that dispenses with both the advertisement and the ordinary selection procedure where several external evaluations exist.

**Q2-3 The logic of collegial control**
Source: Freidson (b11) on collegial control; Waters (b13); Larson (b10) on the professional project; Abbott (b14).
Expected effect: where the judgement of whom to admit belongs to the collegial body, open competition is an act of surrendering that control to an external procedure. Not holding a search is consistent with preserving professional autonomy.
Supporting evidence: **no direct empirical work on university faculty hiring was found.**
Counter-evidence or limits: Bills (b15) argues that the relation between credentials and job assignment holds under explanations other than credentialism.
Scope: general theory, but the fit with universities is the strongest of any here.

This is the largest gap in the map. It is the core hypothesis for Q2, and no study testing it in university personnel decisions was reached.

**Q2-4 Search costs and the screening burden**
Source: Stigler (c03); Rees (c01) on the distinction between the extensive and intensive margins.
Expected effect: search is costly, and the employer stops where marginal search cost equals marginal benefit. An open search increases the number of candidates while thinning the information held on each.
Supporting evidence: Barron and Bishop (c14) and Barron, Bishop, and Dunkelberg (c15) measure employer-side search costs directly. Van Ours and Ridder (c18) show that most of a vacancy's duration is spent on selection.
Counter-evidence or limits: all of these use firm data, and screening costs in the academic labor market have not been measured. Existing jp01 does report a mean of 15 applications and a maximum of 183 at Tokyo Metropolitan University, with a science faculty mean of 46.00, which is suggestive that excess applications are a real cost.
Scope: general.

**Q2-5 The informational advantage of the referral channel**
Source: Montgomery (c11); Saloner (c09); Granovetter (b32, b33); Lin (b34).
Expected effect: a recommendation carries performance and persistence that do not appear in public records. From the employer's side, the open search is slow and imprecise as a means of acquiring information. This corresponds directly to the academic practice in which a doctoral supervisor's recommendation outweighs the application file.
Supporting evidence: Hensvik and Skans (c35) test Montgomery's homophily assumption directly and find that firms hiring former co-workers obtain workers with higher military enlistment test scores. Pallais and Sands (c33), across three field experiments, separate the informational effect from the monitoring effect and find the advantage arises from the information embedded in the referral itself. Zinovyeva and Bagues (e66) find in Spanish promotion reviews that weak ties raise both success rates and quality.
Counter-evidence or limits: Beaman and Magruder (c36) show experimentally that referral quality depends on the referrer's incentives. Fernandez and Galperin (c29) argue that most estimates of referral effects are selection bias and cannot be read causally.
Scope: general, with high transferability.

**Q2-6 Adverse selection**
Source: Greenwald (c10).
Expected effect: because current employers retain their best workers, candidates appearing on the external market are adversely selected.
Supporting evidence: Bidwell (c39).
Counter-evidence or limits: **in the entry-level doctoral market this mechanism does not hold, since everyone leaves the institution where they took the degree.** Its scope must be restricted to senior appointments and lateral recruitment. This is the mechanism most in need of a restricted scope.
Scope: general, but must be cut by rank in universities.

**Q2-7 Internal promotion is committed in advance**
Source: Lazear and Rosen (c38) on tournaments; Chan (c37); Lazear and Oyer (c24) on port-of-entry design; existing th05.
Expected effect: where the senior post is already promised as the prize in an internal contest, an external search breaks that contract. This is the theoretical origin of the structure in which tenure track and promotion are settled before any search.
Supporting evidence: Bertheau (c22) finds in an EU establishment survey that **66% of establishments normally search internally**. DeVaro and Morita (c41); DeVaro and colleagues (c42); existing jp01 (78.3% of professorial appointments by promotion).
Counter-evidence or limits: Keller (c40) is decisive here because it separates hiring internally from skipping the posting (see "Is Non-Search Hiring Inefficient?").
Scope: general. It corresponds directly to the Japanese chair system and promotion practice.

**Q2-8 The promotion pathway itself was built for legal legitimacy**
Source: Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer, and Scott (a16).
Expected effect: formal internal promotion machinery was built not for efficiency or control but to demonstrate compliance with federal EEO law after 1964. The internal promotion pathway is therefore itself a device for supplying legitimacy, parallel to rather than substituting for the open search.
Supporting evidence: a retrospective event history of 279 organizations, tracing how personnel managers experimented with compliance strategies in anticipation of judicial sanction and formalized promotion decisions.
Counter-evidence or limits: it competes with the efficiency account in existing th05 and the incentive account in Q2-7. Which of them fits the Japanese chair system and succession practice has not been examined.
Scope: general, but dependent on US law. Transfer to Japan is doubtful given Q2-1.

**Q2-9 Investment in firm-specific skill**
Source: Lazear and Oyer (c24).
Supporting evidence: Bertheau (c22) finds that providing on-the-job training correlates positively with internal hiring while variable pay does not.
Counter-evidence or limits: much academic capital is portable across institutions, so transfer of this mechanism to universities is only partial.
Scope: general, partial transfer.

**Q2-10 Information about unknown candidates is a public good**
Source and evidence: Pallais (c26).
Expected effect: an individual employer cannot appropriate the information about ability generated by hiring an unknown candidate, so such hiring falls below the social optimum. This gives a market-failure account of the "safest bet" in existing en03.
Counter-evidence or limits: the field experiment took place in an online labor market, and extrapolation to the academic labor market is untested.
Scope: general.

**Q2-11 Positions are hoarded as organizational surplus**
Source: Tilly (b04) on **opportunity hoarding**; Tomaskovic-Devey and Avent-Holt (b07); the closure rules of Parkin (b02) and Murphy (b03).
Expected effect: a department treats a position as organizational surplus and privileges the claim of "our own people," so allocation through an open search is not chosen at all.
Supporting evidence: Roscigno and colleagues (b05); Weeden (b06).
Counter-evidence or limits: Souto-Maior (b09) argues that **hoarding can occur even where no one performs an exclusionary act**. The inference from observed hoarding to deliberate exclusion by someone does not hold.
Scope: general.

**Q2-12 The chair system and the assistant post raise successors internally**
Source: Amano (d08); Nakayama (d13); the study of the assistant post by Ito, Iwata, and Nakano (d14); Iwata on the associate professorship (d15); Kato Takeshi (d16).
Expected effect: the professor selects a successor internally, and the destination of the post is settled before any vacancy arises.
Supporting evidence: existing jp04; existing jp07 (in education faculties at researcher-training universities, open searches numbered zero everywhere except seven at Hiroshima).
Counter-evidence or limits: Daizen (d20) shows from government statistics that **the share of foreign faculty rose from 1.2% in 1983 to 3.4% in 2007**, and that the share of new appointees with prior employment outside universities also increased. Ushiogi (d10) shows that the chair system was not monolithic even within the imperial universities.
Scope: university-specific and Japan-specific.

**Q2-13 Establishment standards on staff numbers and qualifications permit design around a particular person**
Source: Articles 8, 10, and 13 through 16 of the Standards for the Establishment of Universities (d03).
Expected effect: at the point of application, an organization can be designed around specific individuals who satisfy the qualification requirements, and any subsequent search becomes ratification.
Supporting evidence: Yamanoi (d18) treats the linkage between establishing a master's program and recruiting staff.
Counter-evidence or limits: no primary material on how the establishment council's faculty review actually operates was reached, so this mechanism remains a hypothesis.
Scope: university-specific and Japan-specific.

**Q2-14 Fixed-term appointment and the ten-year conversion exception separate the entrance from the permanent post**
Source: Article 18(1) of the Labor Contracts Act; Articles 4, 5, and 7 of the Fixed-Term Appointment Act; Article 15-2 of the Act on Vitalizing Science, Technology and Innovation Creation (e22).
Expected effect: Article 18 creates a right to convert to indefinite employment after five years in aggregate, but Article 15-2 substitutes "ten years" for "five years." Fixed-term posts can therefore be cycled for ten years, which makes it possible to open the fixed-term entrance through searches while filling permanent posts by another route. The three categories in Article 4 of the Fixed-Term Appointment Act shape how advertisements are written.
Supporting evidence: existing jp11 (the 225 women-only searches target mainly fixed-term assistant and associate professorships); existing jp14.
Counter-evidence or limits: no study directly testing this causal claim was reached.
Scope: university-specific and Japan-specific.

**Q2-15 Policy targets and legal threats steer the choice of pathway**
Source: in Japan, the Fifth Basic Plan for Gender Equality (e23) and Article 8 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (e19). In the United States, SFFA (e06), Texas SB 17 (e07), and Executive Order 14173 (e02).
Expected effect: in Japan, numerical targets on hiring shares generate the design of searches restricted to a category. Article 8 provides the basis for women-only searches as an exception to the prohibition on sex discrimination in Article 5. In the United States, the legal risk attached to DEI requirements either drives cluster hires and target hires out of use or pushes them into routes that avoid a search altogether.
Supporting evidence: existing jp11 (225 postings in AY2023). Kim and Hamilton (e18) report anticipatory compliance, in which public universities change hiring practice before legislation passes. Existing en16 analyzes how cluster hiring functions as a strategic back door for avoiding competitive risk.
Counter-evidence or limits: on the Japanese side there is no study relating target attainment to search design. On the US side, e18 is an unrefereed preprint with unconfirmed methods, and evidence is lacking on which of avoidance and retreat is occurring.
Scope: university-specific.

## How the Mechanisms Relate

Where several theories address the same phenomenon, the relations fall into three kinds.

### Competing

| Phenomenon | Position A | Position B | Evidence needed to adjudicate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Why internal promotion pathways exist | Efficiency (existing th05, c24, c22) | Legal institution (a16) | Whether the form and timing of these pathways differ across legal regimes. a16 covers only 279 US organizations |
| Why internal candidates are favored | Incentives (c37, c38) | Adverse selection (c10) | Whether internal favoring appears in the entry-level doctoral market. If it does, adverse selection is rejected and incentives survive |
| Judging by institutional prestige | Statistical discrimination and signaling (c07, c08, b38, b27) | Closure (b04, b22) | Whether predictive power survives controlling for prestige. b39 and b28 specify the divergence conditions |
| Similar people being selected | Preference (b35, b30 choice homophily) | Opportunity structure (b31 induced homophily) | Applying b31's decomposition to faculty hiring data. No such application exists |
| Increasing transparency | Improvement | Counterproductive (e51, e72) | e60 lies between the two; specifying the conditions is the key |
| Committee discretion | Bias (e58, existing en01) | Expertise (e67, e66) | e67 concerns grant review and e66 promotion review; neither tests faculty hiring itself |
| How to evaluate decoupling | Pathology (a01, a10) | Function (a12, a03, a40) | a12 and a40 are both unconfirmed in the text. This is the weakest counter-account here |

### Complementary

Q1-3 and Q1-4 act separately on the receiving and deciding sides. Q1-2 and Q1-6 are different layers of the reason a search is posted: the first is why it must be posted, the second why posting is cheap; in Japan the first is absent and only the second remains. Q2-4 and Q2-5 are the two ends of Rees's extensive and intensive margins within one framework. Q1-5 and c37 are the descriptive account and the normative justification of the same act.

### Nested

Q1-1 is the outermost frame, and Q1-2, Q1-5, Q1-8, and Q1-9 sit within it as instances. Q2-1 and Q2-2 are not inverses but different states: in the first no obligation exists, in the second an obligation exists and exceptions are defined. That distinction is the core of the institutional difference between Japan and the Anglophone world. Q2-11 can serve as a superordinate concept over Q2-3, Q2-7, and Q2-12, but as b09 shows, hoarding arises without exclusionary acts, so reducing them to the superordinate concept loses the ability to distinguish mechanisms.

### Why They Do Not Converge

There are three reasons, and insufficient collection is not one of them.

First, they explain different phenomena. The theories strong on Q1 (decoupling, legal endogeneity, procedural justice) explain almost nothing about Q2, and those strong on Q2 (search costs, referral information, adverse selection) explain almost nothing about Q1. Q2-5 in particular cannot explain why a merely formal search is posted at all. If efficiency were the reason, the employer could simply skip the search.

Second, they operate at different levels of analysis. Individual cognition (Q1-3, Q1-4), the committee as a setting (Q1-5, Q1-8), the organization (Q1-1, Q2-7), and the field and legal regime (Q1-2, Q2-1, Q2-2) each operate at their own level, and none substitutes for another.

Third, whether a mechanism is present at all varies with the institutional environment. Q1-2 is strong in the United States and has no corresponding legal source in Japan. Q2-2 exists in the Anglophone world and Germany and not in Japan. What travels under the single label "predetermined search" is quite likely produced by different mechanisms in different institutional environments.

## Is Non-Search Hiring Inefficient?

To keep the account from tilting one way, research refuting the proposition that predetermined hiring is inefficient was sought deliberately. The result is that several independent bodies of data support the view that non-search pathways can be efficient for the employer.

Bidwell (c39) finds in the investment banking arm of a US financial services firm that internal promotees outperform external hires over their first two years and leave less often, and yet external hires are paid about 18% more. Burks and colleagues (c31), across nine firms in three industries, find that referred workers have similar productivity on most measures and that the profit difference comes from lower turnover and lower hiring costs. Dustmann and colleagues (c34), Hensvik and Skans (c35), and Brown and colleagues (c32) show from administrative data that referred hires earn more and leave less. Zottoli and Wanous (c43) show that personnel research arrived at the same phenomenon independently of economics.

There is comparable counter-evidence on the university side. Zinovyeva and Bagues (e66) find that weak ties raise both success rates and quality. Li (e67) finds that closely specialized reviewers are biased and also better informed about quality, so that on net discretion improves selection. Behaghel and colleagues (e68) find in a large French field experiment that anonymizing résumés actually lowered minority candidates' interview rates. In the hiring scenario experiment of Williams and Ceci (e69), equally qualified women were preferred two to one. Culpepper and colleagues (d57) show that search waivers are also deliberate instruments for diversity goals.

However, Keller (c40), across 8,107 internal hires in a large US health services organization, finds that **workers hired through posting receive higher performance ratings, are paid more, and leave less often than those hired through slotting**, interpreting this as posting widening the candidate pool and tightening the informational standard at selection. Hiring internally and skipping the posting are therefore separable. The internal advantage Bidwell found is an advantage of being internal, not an advantage of being slotted. Isolate the latter and outcomes get worse.

The efficiency defense of the predetermined search does not survive that separation.

## Whom Japanese Sociology of Education Left This Subject To

*The Journal of Educational Sociology* (Nihon Kyoiku Shakai Gakkai) is the central venue for the field in Japan, so we checked how it has handled this subject. The answer is that it has not.

Across the journal's J-STAGE holdings (914 items in the old series, 491 in the new, 1,405 in total), **only five peer-reviewed articles** take the recruitment, appointment, or careers of university faculty as their subject: Cummings (1971), Yamanoi (1980), Iwata (1994), Iwata (1995), and Kato T. (1996). Three of the five are historical studies, leaving **two empirical articles on contemporary hiring, from 1971 and 1980**. Since 1996 the count of peer-reviewed articles has been zero for thirty years.

The society has not ignored the subject. The journal reviewed every major monograph in the field: Shinbori (1984), Yamanoi (1990), Arimoto and Ehara (1996), Arimoto (2011), Arimoto (2016), and Maeda (2023). But a book review is not an article. That Yukawa, Sakanashi, and Murasawa wrote "What Can Research on the Academic Profession Do?" for the 2019 review special issue was itself an acknowledgement of the gap. The 2024 special issue on academic freedom lined up five articles touching personnel autonomy, and not one of them analyzes the hiring process itself.

The empirical accumulation sits outside the journal: Hiroshima University's RIHE publications, the Japanese Association of Higher Education Research, and Nagoya University's journal have been the actual venues.

### Three questions asked, one not

Japanese sociology of education has asked three questions here.

**The outcome of allocation.** Since Shinbori (1965) named the academic clique and Yamanoi (1990) named the mechanism of selection and allocation, a tradition of describing who moves from where to where has continued. Kato M.'s (2022) inbreeding analysis is its direct descendant.

**The changing profession.** The Carnegie survey and its CAP successor placed duties, time allocation, and attitudes on an internationally comparable grid. The question there is what the academic profession is, not how it recruits.

**The supply-demand imbalance.** After graduate expansion, Hamanaka (2002), Urata (2015), and Kobayashi Y. (2017) traced the gap between doctoral supply and post availability. Hiring is an outcome variable in this work, not a process.

What has not been asked is **the process by which an appointment gets settled**: what a search committee looks at and whom it keeps, whom the wording of an advertisement excludes, and when and by whom the decision is made in cases where it is settled in advance. Japanese empirical work on these three has advanced little since Yamanoi's (2000) matching analysis. Only once JREC-IN data became usable did Katsuragi (2022) and Kato M. (2023, 2024) begin treating advertisements as primary data. Both, however, work from the document side and never reach the deciding side.

The largest gap is that **Q2 has never been posed**. Japanese research has consistently asked how open searches are run, never why declining the open-search form might be rational.

The same question has been posed for another occupation within the same society. Maeda (2023) asked why examinations for primary and secondary teacher recruitment began and spread in postwar Japan, and showed that the introduction of open examination ran on a logic other than merit. For university faculty, that question has yet to be asked.

## Gaps, and Designs That Would Fill Them

Ordered by how readily they can be filled, with a review article in view.

**Gap 1: the collegial control hypothesis (Q2-3) has no university-level evidence.** Freidson's collegial control is the core hypothesis for Q2 and has never been tested in university personnel decisions. Keyword search was run in a second round and still turned up nothing, so this gap can be upgraded from "unexplored" to "probably absent." There is now a foothold from the closure side, however. Ganuza and Salö (x02) analyzed 109 external expert reports submitted for 57 posts in Swedish as a Second Language between 2000 and 2020 and show that the experts make almost no use of quantitative proxies, enacting closure instead by redrawing the boundaries of the subject area and placing candidates on a core-to-periphery scheme. In their words, this mechanism of social closure "tends to overshadow other ways of assessing the candidates' research qualifications and skills." Because what enacts closure is the collegial body's own boundary-work, the study supports Freidson's hypothesis from the side. A candidate design compares institutions differing in where the decision right sits (faculty assembly, dean, president, corporate headquarters) and tests the prediction that the closer the right sits to the collegial body, the lower the share of open searches. In Japan the 2014 School Education Act amendment and corporatization moved that locus at different speeds across institutions, which supports a difference-in-differences design. That premise needs settling first. Takatsu (d22) concludes from the statutory text that "the reading under which the faculty assembly remains the body that substantively decides still holds even after the 2014 amendment" (p. 233), explicitly rejecting the received view that the amendment demoted it to an advisory body. The author acknowledges holding a minority position and notes that the three main higher-education unions also take the advisory-body reading. A design comparing where the decision right sits therefore has to settle this dispute before it can be built.

**Gap 2: for the direct measurement of Q1, the method already exists.** Yamanoi (d17) matched 1,200 job advertisements sent to one national university's faculty of education in 1975, 1981, 1987, and 1992 against the *National Directory of University Staff*, identifying the person each posting had filled, and analyzed 694 hires at lecturer rank or above. Fit was operationalized not as a composite index but as rank-specific match rates with cross-tabulations and chi-square tests (100% at lecturer, 90% at associate professor, 80% at professor). Herschberg and colleagues (e55) designed the gap between formal and applied criteria as an explicit object of measurement. Combining the two allows matching JREC-IN postings against hiring outcomes at scale to measure **the degree to which the stated conditions fit the person eventually hired**. This approaches the sister note's gap (no direct measurement of the rate) as a question of fit rather than of prevalence.

**Gap 3 (partly closed): one applicant-side survey exists in English, and none in Japanese.** The sister note's claim that no study of applicants' perceptions exists rested on insufficient search. Fernandes and colleagues (x06) surveyed 317 applicants anonymously between May 2018 and May 2019 and tracked the 7,644 applications they had submitted. Of those, 4,365 (57%) never produced any response at all; 2,920 (38%) produced a formal rejection. Applicants described the process, whatever its outcome, as unnecessarily stressful, time-consuming, and lacking feedback. What that survey measured, however, is the opacity of the process, not whether applicants felt the outcome had been settled in advance. No study measuring that perception directly could be found in English either. In Japanese there is no peer-reviewed study at all: the search returned only personal blogs and note posts, the same layer of experiential accounts already represented by Sakurada (jse-98) and Saito (jse-99). The theoretical footing for measurement is in place: the interaction in Brockner and Wiesenfeld (a25) whereby the appearance of the procedure matters more the worse the outcome, and the applicant reactions instruments in Hausknecht and colleagues (a27). Layering these onto the x06 design would measure perceived procedural fairness and perceived predetermination together. What Q1-3 predicts is an asymmetry: the fairer a search looks, the lower the reported sense of predetermination, and that is no evidence of substance.

**Gap 4: whether the mechanisms are the same in Japan and the Anglophone world has not been tested.** What this round did establish is that the hierarchy of legal sources differs three ways: a cabinet decision in Japan, anti-discrimination law in the United States, higher education statute in Germany. Reymert and colleagues (d65) already demonstrate a design comparing national and disciplinary differences in evaluative culture, which could be extended to include Japan.

**Gap 5 (closed): the functional account of decoupling has been secured.** The counter-account that loose coupling between form and substance can be functional rather than pathological is now backed verbatim from the full texts of Wijen (a12, Erasmus repository author manuscript) and Haack and colleagues (a40, CBS Research Portal accepted version); the substance is folded into the counter-evidence row of Q1-1. The remaining candidate, Orton and Weick (a03), could not be reached through any of six routes (Semantic Scholar, Unpaywall, CORE, scholar.archive.org, the publisher page, ResearchGate) and stands on its bibliographic record alone. Two sources suffice as the main pillars, so this gap is treated as closed.

**Gap 6: Q1-6 has not been tested in Japan.** Whether the free and easy posting on JREC-IN increased searches lacking substance is testable: JREC-IN holds over 190,000 postings from 2001 to 2020 (existing jp03), which supports a time-series design relating changes in posting cost to posting counts, application counts, and hiring outcomes.

## A Note on Verification Level

This map was built in two stages.

In the first, the WebSearch budget was exhausted and none of the five strands ran a single search. Discovery and verification were carried out entirely through the Crossref, OpenAlex, OpenLibrary, CiNii Research, J-STAGE, and NDL Search APIs, together with primary legal sources including the e-Gov statute API, eCFR, the Federal Register, govinfo, and Cornell LII. Bibliographic precision improved under that constraint: every DOI resolves to a primary record, and in the process three bibliographic errors in the commissioning brief were corrected (the journal for van Ours and Ridder 1992, the journal for Autor 2001, and the title of Gilliland 1993). What went missing was anything findable only by keyword search.

The second stage removed that constraint. Discovery and verification were redone across five non-overlapping assignments running 185 searches in total. The results fall into three kinds.

**Some gaps closed.** Modern empirical work applying professional closure to academic recruitment (x02) and a study measuring applicants' perceptions (x06) both exist. A leading candidate for decoupling theory applied explicitly to university personnel decisions (x01) was also found. Among primary sources, the largest outstanding item on the Anglophone side (the full texts of the AAUP 1940 Statement and 1915 Declaration), the Hausberufung provisions across all sixteen German states, the primary documents on Japanese tenure-track policy, and the verbatim holding in the Mitsubishi Jushi case were all secured.

**Some claims collapsed.** Running the searches surfaced 19 items whose bibliography or argument had been recorded wrongly. Two of them matter. Item d24 studies administrative-manager appointments at national universities, not faculty appointments, and never mentions the share of open searches. Item d19 (the Arimoto volume) records changes in academic attitudes across two survey waves in 1992 and 2007; it does not take chair systems, recruitment, or succession as its subject. Neither can serve as evidence for Q2. On the theory side, reading Kossinets and Watts (b31) as settling whether homophily is structural or preferential was the wrong question to put: their conclusion is that choice and induced homophily interact dynamically and amplify across generations.

**Some areas turned out to be empty even after searching.** Since keyword search was run and found nothing, these can be upgraded from "unexplored" to "probably absent": empirical work applying Freidson's collegial control to academic recruitment, studies measuring the fair process effect in academic searches, quantitative measurement of speaking time or influence within committees, and peer-reviewed Japanese work on applicants' perceptions.

Even after two stages, few sources were read beyond the abstract. The Japanese-language books in Strand D are the sharpest case: five of seven could be reached neither in full text nor through a peer-reviewed review. How each author states the causal link between the chair system and designated succession remains unsettled.

## References

Items cited above, out of 367 in total. Ids correspond to the row ids in the internal corpus `source/review/predetermined-faculty-hiring-mechanisms/papers.md` (Strands A–E are the 210 items; Japanese sociology of education is Strand F as jse-*; realist synthesis methodology is Strand G as rms-*; second-round additions are x-* and p-*).
The 63 items in the sister note (ids beginning jp, en, ib, nw, or th) are not repeated here; for those, see [the sister note](https://jamjet-iqbal.com/en/notes/predetermined-faculty-hiring-literature/).

**Strand A. Organization theory and institutionalism (37)**

1. [a01] Bromley, P.; Powell, W. W. 2012. *From Smoke and Mirrors to Walking the Talk: Decoupling in the Contemporary World* Academy of Management Annals, 6(1), 483–530. https://doi.org/10.5465/19416520.2012.684462
2. [a02] Weick, K. E. 1976. *Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems* Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(1), 1–. https://doi.org/10.2307/2391875
3. [a03] Orton, J. D.; Weick, K. E. 1990. *Loosely Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization* Academy of Management Review, 15(2), 203–. https://doi.org/10.2307/258154
4. [a04] Boxenbaum, E.; Jonsson, S. 2017. *Isomorphism, Diffusion and Decoupling: Concept Evolution and Theoretical Challenges* The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (2nd ed.), 77–97. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446280669.n4
5. [a05] Tolbert, P. S.; Zucker, L. G. 1983. *Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880–1935* Administrative Science Quarterly, 28(1), 22–. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392383
6. [a06] Westphal, J. D.; Zajac, E. J. 1994. *Substance and Symbolism in CEOs' Long-Term Incentive Plans* Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), 367–. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393295
7. [a07] Westphal, J. D.; Zajac, E. J. 2001. *Decoupling Policy from Practice: The Case of Stock Repurchase Programs* Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(2), 202–228. https://doi.org/10.2307/2667086 / OA: https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstreams/b2d50e4d-89db-4895-b7b5-8be728999ea4/download
8. [a08] Westphal, J. D.; Gulati, R.; Shortell, S. M. 1997. *Customization or Conformity? An Institutional and Network Perspective on the Content and Consequences of TQM Adoption* Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(2), 366–394. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393924 / OA(投稿版): http://hdl.handle.net/2152/29320
9. [a09] Tilcsik, A. 2010. *From Ritual to Reality: Demography, Ideology, and Decoupling in a Post-Communist Government Agency* Academy of Management Journal, 53(6), 1474–1498. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.57318905 / OA: https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/34997/1/TilcsikAMJ.pdf
10. [a10] MacLean, T. L.; Behnam, M. 2010. *The Dangers of Decoupling: The Relationship Between Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized Misconduct* Academy of Management Journal, 53(6), 1499–1520. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.57319198 / OA: SSRN abstract_id=2019165
11. [a11] Crilly, D.; Zollo, M.; Hansen, M. T. 2012. *Faking It or Muddling Through? Understanding Decoupling in Response to Stakeholder Pressures* Academy of Management Journal, 55(6), 1429–1448. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.0697
12. [a12] Wijen, F. 2014. *Means versus Ends in Opaque Institutional Fields: Trading off Compliance and Achievement in Sustainability Standard Adoption* Academy of Management Review, 39(3), 302–323. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2012.0218 / OA: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/51762
13. [a13] Oliver, C. 1991. *Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes* Academy of Management Review, 16(1), 145–. https://doi.org/10.2307/258610
14. [a16] Dobbin, F.; Sutton, J. R.; Meyer, J. W.; Scott, W. R. 1993. *Equal Opportunity Law and the Construction of Internal Labor Markets* American Journal of Sociology, 99(2), 396–427. https://doi.org/10.1086/230269
15. [a18] Suchman, M. C. 1995. *Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches* Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–. https://doi.org/10.2307/258788
16. [a19] Deephouse, D. L.; Bundy, J.; Tost, L. P.; Suchman, M. C. 2017. *Organizational Legitimacy: Six Key Questions* The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (2nd ed.), 27–52. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446280669.n2
17. [a20] Thibaut, J.; Walker, L. 1975. *Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis* Lawrence Erlbaum Associates（Halsted Press / Wiley 配給）. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL5104393W （到達確認済み。DOI なし）
18. [a21] Leventhal, G. S. 1980. *What Should Be Done with Equity Theory?* Social Exchange（Springer US, Boston）, 27–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-3087-5_2
19. [a22] Lind, E. A.; Tyler, T. R. 1988. *The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice* Springer/Plenum（Critical Issues in Social Justice）. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-2115-4
20. [a23] Folger, R.; Rosenfield, D.; Grove, J.; Corkran, L. 1979. *Effects of "voice" and peer opinions on responses to inequity* Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(12), 2253–2261. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.37.12.2253
21. [a24] van den Bos, K.; Lind, E. A.; Vermunt, R.; Wilke, H. A. M. 1997. *How do I judge my outcome when I do not know the outcome of others? The psychology of the fair process effect* Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(5), 1034–1046. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.5.1034
22. [a25] Brockner, J.; Wiesenfeld, B. M. 1996. *An integrative framework for explaining reactions to decisions: Interactive effects of outcomes and procedures* Psychological Bulletin, 120(2), 189–208. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.120.2.189
23. [a26] Gilliland, S. W. 1993. *The Perceived Fairness of Selection Systems: An Organizational Justice Perspective* Academy of Management Review, 18(4), 694–. https://doi.org/10.2307/258595
24. [a27] Hausknecht, J. P.; Day, D. V.; Thomas, S. C. 2004. *Applicant Reactions to Selection Procedures: An Updated Model and Meta-Analysis* Personnel Psychology, 57(3), 639–683. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2004.00003.x
25. [a28] Truxillo, D. M.; Steiner, D. D.; Gilliland, S. W. 2004. *The Importance of Organizational Justice in Personnel Selection: Defining When Selection Fairness Really Matters* International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 12(1–2), 39–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0965-075x.2004.00262.x / OA 全文: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/j.0965-075X.2004.00262.x
26. [a29] Cohen, M. D.; March, J. G.; Olsen, J. P. 1972. *A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice* Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(1), 1–. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392088
27. [a30] Cohen, M. D.; March, J. G. 1974. *Leadership and Ambiguity: The American College President* McGraw-Hill（後に Harvard Business School Press）. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL5109223W （到達確認済み）
28. [a31] Birnbaum, R. 1988. *How Colleges Work: The Cybernetics of Academic Organization and Leadership* Jossey-Bass. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL4281113W （到達確認済み）
29. [a32] Schofer, E.; Meyer, J. W. 2005. *The Worldwide Expansion of Higher Education in the Twentieth Century* American Sociological Review, 70(6), 898–920. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240507000602
30. [a33] Meyer, J. W.; Ramirez, F. O.; Frank, D. J.; Schofer, E. 2006. *Higher Education as an Institution* CDDRL Working Paper（Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law）. https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/higher_education_as_an_institution （到達確認済み、2006-05-01）
31. [a34] Krücken, G.; Meier, F. 2006. *Turning the University into an Organizational Actor* Globalization and Organization: World Society and Organizational Change（Oxford University Press）, 241–257. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199284535.003.0011
32. [a35] Espeland, W. N.; Sauder, M. 2007. *Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds* American Journal of Sociology, 113(1), 1–40. https://doi.org/10.1086/517897 / OA: https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstreams/71a502d6-5f93-4c8e-9a4c-53cbdca3f784/download
33. [a36] Sauder, M.; Espeland, W. N. 2009. *The Discipline of Rankings: Tight Coupling and Organizational Change* American Sociological Review, 74(1), 63–82. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240907400104 / OA: https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstreams/b7a0207c-63b5-44e6-afea-58ea4bcd3af8/download
34. [a37] Hallett, T. 2010. *The Myth Incarnate: Recoupling Processes, Turmoil, and Inhabited Institutions in an Urban Elementary School* American Sociological Review, 75(1), 52–74. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122409357044
35. [a38] Coburn, C. E. 2004. *Beyond Decoupling: Rethinking the Relationship Between the Institutional Environment and the Classroom* Sociology of Education, 77(3), 211–244. https://doi.org/10.1177/003804070407700302
36. [a39] Kraatz, M. S.; Zajac, E. J. 1996. *Exploring the Limits of the New Institutionalism: The Causes and Consequences of Illegitimate Organizational Change* American Sociological Review, 61(5), 812–836. https://doi.org/10.2307/2096455
37. [a40] Haack, P.; Martignoni, D.; Schoeneborn, D. 2021. *A Bait-and-Switch Model of Corporate Social Responsibility* Academy of Management Review, 46(3), 440–464. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2018.0139 / OA: http://hdl.handle.net/10398/5ade1210-9813-4983-8b64-c8574682fe8d

**Strand B. Social closure and reproduction (40)**

38. [b01] Weber, M.（Roth, G.; Wittich, C. 編訳）. 1922／1978（2013年版）. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* University of California Press. ISBN 9780520280021 / https://openlibrary.org/isbn/9780520280021.json
39. [b02] Parkin, F. 1979. *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique* Tavistock Publications（英）／Columbia University Press（米）. ISBN 0422767903 / 0231048807
40. [b03] Murphy, R. 1988. *Social Closure: The Theory of Monopolization and Exclusion* Clarendon Press / Oxford University Press. ISBN 0198272685
41. [b04] Tilly, C. 1998. *Durable Inequality* University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520924222
42. [b05] Roscigno, V. J.; Garcia, L. M.; Bobbitt-Zeher, D. 2007（OpenAlex は 2006 と記録）. *Social Closure and Processes of Race/Sex Employment Discrimination* The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 609(1), 16–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716206294898
43. [b06] Weeden, K. A. 2002. *Why Do Some Occupations Pay More than Others? Social Closure and Earnings Inequality in the United States* American Journal of Sociology, 108(1), 55–101. https://doi.org/10.1086/344121
44. [b07] Tomaskovic-Devey, D.; Avent-Holt, D. 2019. *Relational Inequalities: An Organizational Approach* Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190624422.001.0001
45. [b08] Voss, K. 2010. *Enduring Legacy? Charles Tilly and Durable Inequality* The American Sociologist, 41(4), 368–374. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-010-9113-y
46. [b09] Souto-Maior, J. M. 2026. *Hoarding without hoarders: Opportunity hoarding in the absence of exclusionary behaviors* Rationality and Society, 38(2), 184–221. https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631261417800
47. [b10] Larson, M. S. 1977（2022年版）. *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis* University of California Press. ISBN 9780520323063 / https://www.ucpress.edu/books/the-rise-of-professionalism/paper
48. [b11] Freidson, E. 2001. *Professionalism: The Third Logic: On the Practice of Knowledge* Polity Press / University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226262031
49. [b12] Collins, R. 1979（2019年版）. *The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification* Academic Press（初版）／Columbia University Press（2019年版）. https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-credential-society/9780231192347
50. [b13] Waters, M. 1989. *Collegiality, Bureaucratization, and Professionalization: A Weberian Analysis* American Journal of Sociology, 94(5), 945–972. https://doi.org/10.1086/229109
51. [b14] Abbott, A. 2005. *Linked Ecologies: States and Universities as Environments for Professions* Sociological Theory, 23(3), 245–274. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0735-2751.2005.00253.x
52. [b15] Bills, D. B. 2003. *Credentials, Signals, and Screens: Explaining the Relationship Between Schooling and Job Assignment* Review of Educational Research, 73(4), 441–469. https://doi.org/10.3102/00346543073004441
53. [b16] Bourdieu, P. 1989（原著）／1996（英訳）. *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power（原題 La Noblesse d'État）* Les Éditions de Minuit（原著）／Polity Press・Stanford University Press（英訳）. ISBN 9780804733465 / 9780745620282
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56. [b19] Merton, R. K. 1988. *The Matthew Effect in Science, II: Cumulative Advantage and the Symbolism of Intellectual Property* Isis, 79(4), 606–623. https://doi.org/10.1086/354848
57. [b20] Zuckerman, H. 1977. *Scientific Elite: Nobel Laureates in the United States* Free Press（Transaction Publishers 版あり）. ISBN 9780029357606 / 9781560008552
58. [b21] Crane, D. 1965. *Scientists at Major and Minor Universities: A Study of Productivity and Recognition* American Sociological Review, 30(5), 699–（終頁未確認）. https://doi.org/10.2307/2091138
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60. [b23] Han, S.-K. 2003. *Tribal regimes in academia: a comparative analysis of market structure across disciplines* Social Networks, 25(3), 251–280. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-8733(03)00011-X
61. [b24] Bol, T.; de Vaan, M.; van de Rijt, A. 2018. *The Matthew effect in science funding* PNAS, 115(19), 4887–4890. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1719557115
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67. [b31] Kossinets, G.; Watts, D. J. 2009. *Origins of Homophily in an Evolving Social Network* American Journal of Sociology, 115(2), 405–450. https://doi.org/10.1086/599247
68. [b32] Granovetter, M. S. 1973. *The Strength of Weak Ties* American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360–1380. https://doi.org/10.1086/225469
69. [b33] Granovetter, M. 1974／1995（第2版）. *Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers* University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226518404.001.0001
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71. [b35] Rivera, L. A. 2012. *Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case of Elite Professional Service Firms* American Sociological Review, 77(6), 999–1022. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122412463213
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76. [b41] Combes, P.-P.; Linnemer, L.; Visser, M. 2008. *Publish or peer-rich? The role of skills and networks in hiring economics professors* Labour Economics, 15(3), 423–441. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2007.04.003
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**Strand C. The economics of recruitment-channel choice and personnel research (45)**

78. [c01] Rees, A. 1966. *Information Networks in Labor Markets* American Economic Review, 56, 559–. DOI なし。書誌は独立2件の Crossref 登録参照文献リスト（10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.014 / 10.1093/qje/qjv010）で著者・年・巻・開始頁が一致
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80. [c03] Stigler, G. J. 1962. *Information in the Labor Market* Journal of Political Economy, 70(5, Part 2), 94–105. https://doi.org/10.1086/258727
81. [c04] Spence, M. 1973. *Job Market Signaling* Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
82. [c05] Thurow, L. C. 1975. *Generating Inequality* Basic Books（英 Macmillan 版あり）. ISBN 0465026680 / 9780465026685（OpenLibrary /works/OL17962544W）
83. [c06] Jovanovic, B. 1979. *Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover* Journal of Political Economy, 87(5, Part 1), 972–990. https://doi.org/10.1086/260808
84. [c07] Phelps, E. S. 1972. *The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism* American Economic Review, 62(4), 659–661. DOI なし（OpenAlex W1556513643 で著者・年・巻号頁を確認）
85. [c08] Arrow, K. J. 1973. *The Theory of Discrimination* Ashenfelter, O.; Rees, A.（編）*Discrimination in Labor Markets*, Princeton University Press, pp.3–33. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400867066-003（2015年再版、章頁1–33） / 親書 10.1515/9781400867066
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87. [c10] Greenwald, B. C. 1986. *Adverse Selection in the Labour Market* Review of Economic Studies, 53(3), 325–. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297632
88. [c11] Montgomery, J. D. 1991. *Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis* American Economic Review, 81(5), 1407–1418. DOI なし（OpenAlex W1581396473 で著者・年・巻号頁を確認）
89. [c12] Casella, A.; Hanaki, N. 2008. *Information channels in labor markets: On the resilience of referral hiring* Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66(3–4), 492–513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.014
90. [c13] Galenianos, M. 2014. *Hiring through referrals* Journal of Economic Theory, 152, 304–323. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.009
91. [c14] Barron, J. M.; Bishop, J. 1985. *Extensive Search, Intensive Search, and Hiring Costs: New Evidence on Employer Hiring Activity* Economic Inquiry, 23(3), 363–382. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1985.tb01773.x
92. [c15] Barron, J. M.; Bishop, J.; Dunkelberg, W. C. 1985. *Employer Search: The Interviewing and Hiring of New Employees* Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(1), 43–. https://doi.org/10.2307/1928433
93. [c16] Holzer, H. J. 1987. *Hiring Procedures in the Firm: Their Economic Determinants and Outcomes* NBER Working Paper No. 2185. https://doi.org/10.3386/w2185
94. [c17] Marsden, P. V. 1994. *The Hiring Process: Recruitment Methods* American Behavioral Scientist, 37(7), 979–991. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764294037007009
95. [c18] van Ours, J.; Ridder, G. 1992. *Vacancies and the Recruitment of New Employees* Journal of Labor Economics, 10(2), 138–155. https://doi.org/10.1086/298282
96. [c19] DeVaro, J. 2005. *Employer Recruitment Strategies and the Labor Market Outcomes of New Hires* Economic Inquiry, 43(2), 263–282. https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/cbi018
97. [c20] DeVaro, J. 2008. *The labor market effects of employer recruitment choice* European Economic Review, 52(2), 283–314. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.11.001
98. [c21] Davis, S. J.; Faberman, R. J.; Haltiwanger, J. C. 2013. *The Establishment-Level Behavior of Vacancies and Hiring* Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(2), 581–622. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt002
99. [c22] Bertheau, A. 2021. *Employer Search Behavior: Reasons for Internal Hiring* Labour Economics, 73, 102064. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2021.102064
100. [c23] Oyer, P.; Schaefer, S. 2011. *Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives* Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 4B, pp.1769–1823. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0169-7218(11)02418-x
101. [c24] Lazear, E. P.; Oyer, P. 2004. *Internal and external labor markets: a personnel economics approach* Labour Economics, 11(5), 527–554. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2004.01.001
102. [c25] Autor, D. H. 2001. *Wiring the Labor Market* Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(1), 25–40. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.15.1.25
103. [c26] Pallais, A. 2014. *Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets* American Economic Review, 104(11), 3565–3599. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.11.3565
104. [c27] Fernandez, R. M.; Weinberg, N. 1997. *Sifting and Sorting: Personal Contacts and Hiring in a Retail Bank* American Sociological Review, 62(6), 883–. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657345
105. [c28] Fernandez, R. M.; Castilla, E. J.; Moore, P. 2000. *Social Capital at Work: Networks and Employment at a Phone Center* American Journal of Sociology, 105(5), 1288–1356. https://doi.org/10.1086/210432
106. [c29] Fernandez, R. M.; Galperin, R. V. 2014. *The Causal Status of Social Capital in Labor Markets* Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Vol. 40, pp.445–462. https://doi.org/10.1108/s0733-558x(2014)0000040022
107. [c30] Simon, C. J.; Warner, J. T. 1992. *Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings, and Tenure* Journal of Labor Economics, 10(3), 306–330. https://doi.org/10.1086/298289
108. [c31] Burks, S. V.; Cowgill, B.; Hoffman, M.; Housman, M. 2015. *The Value of Hiring through Employee Referrals* Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(2), 805–839. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv010
109. [c32] Brown, M.; Setren, E.; Topa, G. 2016. *Do Informal Referrals Lead to Better Matches? Evidence from a Firm's Employee Referral System* Journal of Labor Economics, 34(1), 161–209. https://doi.org/10.1086/682338
110. [c33] Pallais, A.; Sands, E. G. 2016. *Why the Referential Treatment? Evidence from Field Experiments on Referrals* Journal of Political Economy, 124(6), 1793–1828. https://doi.org/10.1086/688850 / NBER 版 10.3386/w21357
111. [c34] Dustmann, C.; Glitz, A.; Schönberg, U.; Brücker, H. 2016（オンライン2015）. *Referral-based Job Search Networks* Review of Economic Studies, 83(2), 514–546. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv045
112. [c35] Hensvik, L.; Skans, O. N. 2016. *Social Networks, Employee Selection, and Labor Market Outcomes* Journal of Labor Economics, 34(4), 825–867. https://doi.org/10.1086/686253
113. [c36] Beaman, L.; Magruder, J. 2012. *Who Gets the Job Referral? Evidence from a Social Networks Experiment* American Economic Review, 102(7), 3574–3593. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3574
114. [c37] Chan, W. 1996. *External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion* Journal of Labor Economics, 14(4), 555–570. https://doi.org/10.1086/209822
115. [c38] Lazear, E. P.; Rosen, S. 1981. *Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts* Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841–864. https://doi.org/10.1086/261010
116. [c39] Bidwell, M. 2011. *Paying More to Get Less: The Effects of External Hiring versus Internal Mobility* Administrative Science Quarterly, 56(3), 369–407. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839211433562
117. [c40] Keller, J. R. 2018（オンライン2017）. *Posting and Slotting: How Hiring Processes Shape the Quality of Hire and Compensation in Internal Labor Markets* Administrative Science Quarterly, 63(4), 848–878. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839217736045
118. [c41] DeVaro, J.; Morita, H. 2013. *Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis* Journal of Labor Economics, 31(2), 227–269. https://doi.org/10.1086/667814
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**Strand D. University-specific institutions and history (44)**

123. [d01] 日本国（法令）. 1949制定／現行. *教育公務員特例法 第2条（定義）・第3条（採用及び昇任の方法）・第10条（任命権者）* e-Gov 法令検索（昭和二十四年法律第一号）. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/api/1/lawdata/324AC0000000001
124. [d02] 日本国（法令）. 1947制定／教授会条項は2014年改正 `[要一次検証]`. *学校教育法 第93条（教授会）* e-Gov 法令検索（昭和二十二年法律第二十六号）. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/api/1/articles;lawNum=昭和二十二年法律第二十六号;article=第九十三条
125. [d03] 日本国（法令）. 1956制定／基幹教員規定は2022年改正 `[要一次検証]`. *大学設置基準 第8条・第10条・第13〜16条* e-Gov 法令検索（昭和三十一年文部省令第二十八号）. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/api/1/lawdata/331M50000080028
126. [d04] 日本国（法令）. 1997. *大学の教員等の任期に関する法律 第1条・第4条・第5条* e-Gov 法令検索（平成九年法律第八十二号）. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/api/1/lawdata/409AC0000000082
127. [d05] 日本国（法令）. 2003. *国立大学法人法 第12条（役員の任命）・第21条（教育研究評議会）* e-Gov 法令検索（平成十五年法律第百十二号）. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/api/1/lawdata/415AC0000000112
128. [d06] 内閣（閣議決定）. 2001. *第2期科学技術基本計画「② 任期制の広範な普及等による人材の流動性の向上」* 内閣府 総合科学技術会議. https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/kihonkeikaku/honbun.html
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132. [d10] 潮木守一. 1984（講談社学術文庫版1997）. *京都帝国大学の挑戦：帝国大学史のひとこま* 名古屋大学出版会. ISBN 4-930689-18-X / https://ndlsearch.ndl.go.jp/books/R100000002-I000001728413
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137. [d15] 岩田弘三. 1996. *帝大教員集団における助教授職の位置づけ* 大学論集 25: 103-127（広島大学）. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1570572701839936128（ISSN 0302-0142）
138. [d16] 加藤毅. 1996. *大学助手職の研究者養成機能に関する研究* 教育社会学研究 59: 109-126. https://doi.org/10.11151/eds1951.59.109 / https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/eds1951/59/0/59_0_109/_article/-char/ja/
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143. [d21] 早田幸政. 2015. *「教授会自治」の変容と認証評価：2014年学校教育法改正を基軸として* 大学評価研究 14: 71-85. https://doi.org/10.82652/juaauer.14.0_71
144. [d22] 高津芳則. 2025（関連稿2016）. *教授会は学長の諮問機関になったのか？学校教育法第93条の再検討（2-1）（2-2）* 大阪経大論集 76(1): 205-233 ／ 76(2): 33-43. https://doi.org/10.24644/keidaironshu.76.1_205 / https://doi.org/10.24644/keidaironshu.76.2_33 / 関連稿 10.24644/keidaironshu.67.4_173
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146. [d24] 渡辺恵子. 2022. *国立大学における戦略的人的資源管理の構築に向けて* 大学経営政策研究 12: 257-271. https://doi.org/10.51019/daikei.12.0_257
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148. [d51] AAUP / AAC 共同. 1940（1970 Interpretive Comments）. *1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure* AAUP Policy Documents and Reports. https://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure
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151. [d54] Smelser, N. J.; Content, R. 1980. *The Changing Academic Market: General Trends and a Berkeley Case Study* University of California Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL1985926W（ISBN 9780520037533） / 書評 10.1086/227521、10.2307/2578407
152. [d55] Burke, D. L. 1988. *A New Academic Marketplace* Greenwood Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL4103690W（ISBN 9780313263835） / 書評 10.2307/2072583、10.1177/002071529003100108
153. [d56] Yackee, J. W. 2020. *Targets of Opportunity? The History, Law and Practice of Affirmative Action in University Faculty Hiring* SSRN Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3708232
154. [d57] Culpepper, D.; Reed, A. M.; Enekwe, B.; Carter-Veale, W.; LaCourse, W. R.; McDermott, P.; Cresiski, R. H. 2021. *A New Effort to Diversify Faculty: Postdoc-to-Tenure Track Conversion Models* Frontiers in Psychology, 12, 733995. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.733995
155. [d58] University of California, Berkeley, Office for Faculty Equity and Welfare. 2026（参照時点）. *Search Waivers ／ Search Waiver Definitions* UC Berkeley 公式ポリシーページ. https://ofew.berkeley.edu/recruitment/search-waivers / https://ofew.berkeley.edu/recruitment/search-waivers/search-waiver-definitions
156. [d59] University of Wisconsin–Madison. 2015施行／2025改訂. *UW-5008 Recruitment, Assessment, and Selection of Academic, Faculty, Limited, and University Staff Employees* UW–Madison Policy Library. https://policy.wisc.edu/library/UW-5008
157. [d60] ドイツ連邦（法令）. 1976制定／1999年公示版、2019年最終改正. *Hochschulrahmengesetz (HRG) § 45 Ausschreibung von Stellen für Hochschullehrerinnen und Hochschullehrer* gesetze-im-internet.de. https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/hrg/__45.html
158. [d61] バイエルン州（法令）. 2022 `[要一次検証]`. *Bayerisches Hochschulinnovationsgesetz (BayHIG) Art. 66 Berufung von Professorinnen, Professoren, Juniorprofessorinnen…* gesetze-bayern.de. https://www.gesetze-bayern.de/Content/Document/BayHIG-66
159. [d62] Hamann, J. 2019. *The Making of Professors: Assessment and Recognition in Academic Recruitment* Social Studies of Science, 49(6), 919–941. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312719880017（CC-BY-NC）
160. [d64] Reymert, I. 2021（オンライン2020）. *Bibliometrics in Academic Recruitment: A Screening Tool Rather than a Game Changer* Minerva, 59(1), 53–78. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-020-09419-0
161. [d65] Reymert, I.; Jungblut, J.; Borlaug, S. B. 2021. *Are evaluative cultures national or global? A cross-national study on evaluative cultures in academic recruitment processes in Europe* Higher Education, 82(5), 823–843. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-020-00659-3
162. [d66] Musselin, C. 2005. *European Academic Labor Markets in Transition* Higher Education, 49(1–2), 135–154. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-004-2918-2
163. [d67] Ehrenberg, R. G. 2003（NBER WP 2002）. *Studying Ourselves: The Academic Labor Market* Journal of Labor Economics, 21(2), 267–287. https://doi.org/10.1086/345558 / NBER 10.3386/w8965
164. [d68] Stephan, P. E. 2012. *How Economics Shapes Science* Harvard University Press. https://openlibrary.org/works/OL15946665W（ISBN 9780674049710）
165. [d69] Halsey, A. H. 1992. *Decline of Donnish Dominion: The British Academic Professions in the Twentieth Century* Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198273769.001.0001
166. [d70] Perkin, H. J. 1987（2023復刊）. *The Academic Profession in the United Kingdom* Clark, B. R.(ed.), *The Academic Profession: National, Disciplinary, and Institutional Settings*, University of California Press, pp. 13–59. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520311329-004 / 復刊版 10.2307/jj.8306011.6

**Strand E. Law, regulation, and search-committee evidence (44)**

167. [e01] U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. 2004. *Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Implementation of New System（PERM 最終規則。69 FR 77326、RIN 1205-AA66、施行2005-03-28）* Federal Register 69(248): 77326. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2004-12-27/html/04-27653.htm
168. [e02] President of the United States（Executive Order 14173）. 2025. *Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity（90 FR 8633、署名2025-01-21）* Federal Register. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-31/html/2025-02097.htm
169. [e03] OFCCP（41 CFR 60-1.3）. 現行（2026-01-01 版）. *Definitions —「Internet Applicant」* Code of Federal Regulations. https://www.ecfr.gov/api/versioner/v1/full/2026-01-01/title-41.xml?subtitle=B&chapter=60&part=60-1&section=60-1.3
170. [e04] EEOC ほか4機関（29 CFR Part 1607, UGESP）. 現行. *§ 1607.4 Information on impact（four-fifths rule）* Code of Federal Regulations. https://www.ecfr.gov/api/versioner/v1/full/2026-01-01/title-29.xml?subtitle=B&chapter=XIV&part=1607&section=1607.4
171. [e05] U.S. Supreme Court. 1971. *Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424* United States Reports. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/401/424
172. [e06] U.S. Supreme Court. 2023. *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181（No. 20-1199／No. 21-707、2023-06-29）* United States Reports. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/20-1199 （巻頁は e02 の EO 本文で確認）
173. [e07] Texas Legislature（88th Regular Session, SB 17）. 2023. *Tex. Educ. Code § 51.3525（州立高等教育機関の DEI 施策の禁止）* Texas Statutes. https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/88R/billtext/html/SB00017F.htm
174. [e08] Edelman, L. B. 1992. *Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law* American Journal of Sociology, 97(6), 1531–1576. https://doi.org/10.1086/229939
175. [e09] Edelman, L. B.; Uggen, C.; Erlanger, H. S. 1999. *The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth* American Journal of Sociology, 105(2), 406–454. https://doi.org/10.1086/210316
176. [e10] Edelman, L. B.; Krieger, L. H.; Eliason, S. R.; Albiston, C. R.; Mellema, V. 2011. *When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment Structures* American Journal of Sociology, 117(3), 888–954 `[要一次検証]`. https://doi.org/10.1086/661984
177. [e11] Edelman, L. B. 2016. *Working Law: Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil Rights* University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226400938.001.0001（ISBN 9780226400624 / 9780226400761 / 9780226400938）
178. [e12] Krieger, L. H.; Best, R. K.; Edelman, L. B. 2015. *When "Best Practices" Win, Employees Lose: Symbolic Compliance and Judicial Inference in Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Cases* Law & Social Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12116
179. [e13] Bisom-Rapp, S. 1999. *Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice* Florida State University Law Review. DOI なし。書誌のみ確認 `[要一次検証]`
180. [e14] Dobbin, F. 2009. *Inventing Equal Opportunity* Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830893
181. [e15] Kalev, A.; Dobbin, F.; Kelly, E. 2006. *Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies* American Sociological Review, 71(4), 589–617. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240607100404 / OA: SSRN abstract_id=2307128
182. [e16] Fulponi, C. 2021. *No Help Wanted: Fixing the Labor Certification Paradox and Other Barriers to an Effective Employment Immigration System* University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 82(2). https://doi.org/10.5195/lawreview.2020.791
183. [e17] Leong, N. 2025. *Diversity Messaging After Affirmative Action* Minnesota Law Review. https://doi.org/10.24926/265535.4235
184. [e18] Kim, K. W.; Hamilton, L. T. 2025. *Anti-DEI Legislation and Anticipatory Compliance in Faculty Hiring at Public Colleges and Universities* SocArXiv（2025-10-21 公開）. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/yfbcn_v1 / https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/yfbcn
185. [e19] 日本国（法令）. 昭和47年法律第113号（現行）. *雇用の分野における男女の均等な機会及び待遇の確保等に関する法律 第5条・第8条* e-Gov 法令検索. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/347AC0000000113
186. [e20] 日本国（法令）. 昭和24年法律第1号（施行日2026-04-01、最終改正 令和7年法律第68号）. *教育公務員特例法 第3条（採用及び昇任の方法）* e-Gov 法令検索. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/324AC0000000001
187. [e21] 日本国（法令）. 昭和22年法律第120号／昭和25年法律第261号. *国家公務員法 第33条・第36条／地方公務員法 第15条・第18条の2* e-Gov 法令検索. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/322AC0000000120 / https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/325AC0000000261
188. [e22] 日本国（法令）. 平成19年法律第128号／平成9年法律第82号／平成20年法律第63号. *労働契約法 第18条第1項／大学の教員等の任期に関する法律 第4条・第5条・第7条／科学技術・イノベーション創出の活性化に関する法律 第15条の2* e-Gov 法令検索. https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/419AC0000000128 / https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/409AC0000000082 / https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/420AC0100000063
189. [e23] 内閣府男女共同参画局. 2020（令和2年12月25日閣議決定）. *第5次男女共同参画基本計画における女性の登用・採用に関する成果目標一覧（全58項目）* 内閣府. https://www.gender.go.jp/about_danjo/basic_plans/5th/pdf/2-2_mokuhyo.pdf
190. [e51] van den Brink, M.; Benschop, Y.; Jansen, W. 2010. *Transparency in Academic Recruitment: A Problematic Tool for Gender Equality?* Organization Studies, 31(11), 1459–1483. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840610380812
191. [e52] van den Brink, M.; Benschop, Y. 2011（Organization 誌上は 19(4), 507–524）. *Gender Practices in the Construction of Academic Excellence: Sheep with Five Legs* Organization. https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508411414293
192. [e53] van den Brink, M.; Benschop, Y. 2013（オンライン）. *Gender in Academic Networking: The Role of Gatekeepers in Professorial Recruitment* Journal of Management Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12060
193. [e54] van den Brink, M. 2011. *Scouting for Talent: Appointment Practices of Women Professors in Academic Medicine* Social Science & Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.04.016
194. [e55] Herschberg, C.; Benschop, Y.; van den Brink, M. 2018. *Selecting Early-Career Researchers: The Influence of Discourses of Internationalisation and Excellence on Formal and Applied Selection Criteria in Academia* Higher Education, 76, 807–825. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-018-0237-2
195. [e56] Nielsen, M. W. 2015（オンライン。Science and Public Policy 収録）. *Limits to Meritocracy? Gender in Academic Recruitment and Promotion Processes* Science and Public Policy. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scv052
196. [e58] Liera, R. 2019（オンライン先行。AERJ 2020）. *Moving Beyond a Culture of Niceness in Faculty Hiring to Advance Racial Equity* American Educational Research Journal. https://doi.org/10.3102/0002831219888624
197. [e59] O'Meara, K.; Culpepper, D.; Templeton, L. L. 2020. *Nudging Toward Diversity: Applying Behavioral Design to Faculty Hiring* Review of Educational Research, 90(3), 311–348. https://doi.org/10.3102/0034654320914742
198. [e60] Culpepper, D.; White-Lewis, D.; O'Meara, K.; Templeton, L.; Anderson, J. 2023. *Do Rubrics Live up to Their Promise? Examining How Rubrics Mitigate Bias in Faculty Hiring* The Journal of Higher Education, 94(6), 823–850. https://doi.org/10.1080/00221546.2023.2168411
199. [e61] White-Lewis, D. K.; O'Meara, K.; Wessel, J.; Anderson, J.; Culpepper, D.; Templeton, L. 2024. *Making the Band: Constructing Competitiveness in Faculty Hiring Decisions* Research in Higher Education, 65, 1137–1162. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11162-024-09779-6
200. [e62] Smith, D. G.; Turner, C. S.; Osei-Kofi, N.; Richards, S. 2004. *Interrupting the Usual: Successful Strategies for Hiring Diverse Faculty* The Journal of Higher Education. https://doi.org/10.1353/jhe.2004.0006（別レコード 10.1080/00221546.2004.11778900）
201. [e63] Carnes, M.; Sheridan, J.; Fine, E.; Lee, Y.-G.; Filut, A. 2023. *Effect of a Workshop to Break the Bias Habit for Internal Medicine Faculty: A Multisite Cluster Randomized Controlled Study* Academic Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1097/acm.0000000000005271
202. [e64] Honeycutt, N. 2024（v1）／2026（v2, v3）. *Faculty Evaluations of DEI Statements for Academic Hiring* OSF Preprints. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/mwt5r（v3: 10.31234/osf.io/mwt5r_v3）
203. [e65] Bagues, M.; Sylos-Labini, M.; Zinovyeva, N. 2017. *Does the Gender Composition of Scientific Committees Matter?* American Economic Review, 107(4), 1207–1238. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151211
204. [e66] Zinovyeva, N.; Bagues, M. 2015. *The Role of Connections in Academic Promotions* American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(2), 264–292. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20120337
205. [e67] Li, D. 2017. *Expertise versus Bias in Evaluation: Evidence from the NIH* American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150421
206. [e68] Behaghel, L.; Crépon, B.; Le Barbanchon, T. 2015. *Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés* American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20140185
207. [e69] Williams, W. M.; Ceci, S. J. 2015. *National Hiring Experiments Reveal 2:1 Faculty Preference for Women on STEM Tenure Track* Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1418878112
208. [e70] Ceci, S. J.; Kahn, S.; Williams, W. M. 2023. *Exploring Gender Bias in Six Key Domains of Academic Science: An Adversarial Collaboration* Psychological Science in the Public Interest. https://doi.org/10.1177/15291006231163179
209. [e71] Bradley, S. W.; Garven, J. R.; Law, W. W.; West, J. E. 2022. *The Impact of Chief Diversity Officers on Diverse Faculty Hiring* Southern Economic Journal, 89(1), 3–36. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12584（NBER WP 版 10.3386/w24969）
210. [e72] Castilla, E. J.; Benard, S. 2010. *The Paradox of Meritocracy in Organizations* Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(4), 543–576. https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.2010.55.4.543

### Japanese sociology of education (Strand F, items cited above)

211. [jse-01] Shinbori, M. 1965. *Nihon no daigaku kyoju shijo: gakubatsu no kenkyu* [The Japanese Professorial Market: A Study of Academic Cliques]. Toyokan.
212. [jse-02] Cummings, W. K. 1971. "The Changing Academic Marketplace" *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, 26: 68–84. https://doi.org/10.11151/eds1951.26.68
213. [jse-05] Yamanoi, A. 1980. "A Sociological Study of Japanese University Professors" *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, 35: 134–145. https://doi.org/10.11151/eds1951.35.134
214. [jse-09] Yamanoi, A. 1990. *Daigaku kyoju no ido kenkyu* [Mobility of University Professors: Selection and Allocation under Clique Dominance]. Toshindo.
215. [jse-13] Iwata, K. 1994. "Academic Careers of Imperial University Professors" *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, 54: 147–166. https://doi.org/10.11151/eds1951.54.147
216. [jse-14] Iwata, K. 1995. "A Historical Study of the Assistant Post in Universities" *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, 56: 99–118. https://doi.org/10.11151/eds1951.56.99
217. [jse-15] Kato, T. 1996. "The Researcher-Training Function of the University Assistant Post" *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, 59: 109–126. https://doi.org/10.11151/eds1951.59.109
218. [jse-18] Yamanoi, A. 2000. "Open Recruitment of University Faculty: A Matching Analysis of Advertisements and Appointees" *Daigaku Ronshu*, 31: 17–33. https://rihe-publications.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/search/attachfile/49238.pdf
219. [jse-59] Maeda, M. 2023. *Sengo Nihon no kyoin saiyo* [Teacher Recruitment in Postwar Japan: Why Examinations Began and Spread]. Koyo Shobo.
220. [jse-65] Hamanaka, J. 2002. "The Expansion Mechanism of Social Science Master's Programs in the 1990s" *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, 71: 47–66. https://doi.org/10.11151/eds1951.71.47
221. [jse-68] Urata, H. 2015. "Graduate School Change and the Faculty Market" *The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies*, (660): 4–15.
222. [jse-70] Kato, M. 2022. "Employment of Doctoral Graduates as University Faculty: Inbreeding and Concurrent Appointments" *Nagoya Journal of Higher Education*, 22: 115–137.
223. [jse-71] Kato, M. 2023. "Teaching Competence Required of University Faculty: An Attempt Using JREC-IN Advertisement Data" *Nagoya Journal of Higher Education*, 23: 207–226. https://doi.org/10.18999/njhe.23.207
224. [jse-72] Kato, M. 2024. "Competition in University Faculty Searches: The Case of Public University Hiring in Tokyo" *Nagoya Journal of Higher Education*, 24: 181–202. https://doi.org/10.18999/njhe.24.181
225. [jse-73] Katsuragi, K. 2022. "Barriers in the Career Path to a Faculty Position: A Basic Analysis Using JREC-IN Portal Advertisements" *Daigaku Kyoiku Kenkyu* (Kobe University), 30: 49–64. https://doi.org/10.24546/81013317
226. [jse-77] Kobayashi, Y. 2017. *Career Construction and Family Formation among Women with Doctorates*. NISTEP, MEXT.
227. [jse-84] Maruyama, K. 2024. "Academic Freedom and Professional Autonomy: A Study Based on the History of the AAUP" *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, 114: 27–48. https://doi.org/10.11151/eds.114.27
228. Yukawa, Y.; Sakanashi, J.; Murasawa, M. 2019. "What Can Research on the Academic Profession Do? Achievements and Prospects" *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, 104: 81–104. https://doi.org/10.11151/eds.104.81

### Realist synthesis methodology (Strand G, items cited above)

229. [rms-01] Pawson, R.; Tilley, N. 1997. *Realistic Evaluation*. Sage.
230. [rms-05] Pawson, R.; Greenhalgh, T.; Harvey, G.; Walshe, K. 2005. "Realist review – a new method of systematic review designed for complex policy interventions" *Journal of Health Services Research & Policy*, 10(1_suppl), 21–34. https://doi.org/10.1258/1355819054308530
231. [rms-07] Wong, G.; Greenhalgh, T.; Westhorp, G.; Buckingham, J.; Pawson, R. 2013. "RAMESES publication standards: realist syntheses" *BMC Medicine*, 11, 21. https://doi.org/10.1186/1741-7015-11-21
232. [rms-10] Pawson, R. 2006. "Digging for Nuggets: How 'Bad' Research Can Yield 'Good' Evidence" *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 9(2), 127–142. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645570600595314
233. [rms-11] Dalkin, S. M.; Greenhalgh, J.; Jones, D.; Cunningham, B.; Lhussier, M. 2015. "What's in a mechanism? Development of a key concept in realist evaluation" *Implementation Science*, 10, 49. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13012-015-0237-x
234. [rms-18] Bendermacher, G. W. G.; oude Egbrink, M. G. A.; Wolfhagen, I. H. A. P.; Dolmans, D. H. J. M. 2017. "Unravelling quality culture in higher education: a realist review" *Higher Education*, 73(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-015-9979-2
235. [rms-28] Bonell, C.; Jamal, F.; Melendez-Torres, G. J.; Cummins, S. 2015. "'Dark logic': theorising the harmful consequences of public health interventions" *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*, 69(1), 95–98. https://doi.org/10.1136/jech-2014-204671
236. [rms-29] Nishimura, K.; Wu, S. 2024. "The Theory of Realist Evaluation and Its Implications for EBPM in Japan" *The Japanese Journal of Evaluation Studies*, 24(1): 29–44. https://doi.org/10.11278/jjoes.24.1_29
237. [rms-30] Ebihara, K.; Omiya, T. 2025. "A Literature Review of Program Evaluation Using Realist Evaluation" *Journal of Japan Nursing and Health Sciences*, 24: 127–135. https://doi.org/10.20705/jjnhs.24.0_127

### Added in the second round (items cited above)

238. [x01] Liu, S.; Lv, M.; Huang, Q.; Zhang, X. 2025. "Exploring means–ends decoupling in the tenure track system of China's 'Double First-Class' universities: an institutional logics perspective" *Asia Pacific Education Review*, 27(3), 923–942. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12564-025-10055-0
239. [x02] Ganuza, N.; Salö, L. 2023. "Boundary-work and social closure in academic recruitment: Insights from the transdisciplinary subject area Swedish as a Second Language" *Research Evaluation*, 32(2), 515–525. https://doi.org/10.1093/reseval/rvad015
240. [x06] Fernandes, J. D.; Sarabipour, S.; Smith, C. T.; Niemi, N. M.; Jadavji, N. M.; Kozik, A. J.; Holehouse, A. S.; Pejaver, V.; Symmons, O.; Bisson Filho, A. W.; Haage, A. 2020. "A survey-based analysis of the academic job market" *eLife*, 9, e54097. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.54097
241. [x07] Jain, P.; Miller, M. M. 2025. "Beyond representation: the importance of the decision-making process in hiring decisions" *Experimental Economics*, 28(4), 997–1021. https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2025.10024
242. [x08] Musselin, C.; Pigeyre, F. 2009. "How mechanisms implicated in the collective process of academic hiring in France affect discrimination" *Sociologie du Travail*, 51, e81–e103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soctra.2009.06.021
243. [x09] Phillips, J. M. 1998. "Effects of realistic job previews on multiple organizational outcomes: A meta-analysis" *Academy of Management Journal*, 41(6), 673–690. https://doi.org/10.5465/256964
244. [x10] Rynes, S. L.; Cable, D. M. 2003. "Recruitment Research in the Twenty-First Century" in Borman, W. C.; Ilgen, D. R.; Klimoski, R. J. (eds.) *Handbook of Psychology, Vol. 12: Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, Wiley, 55–76. https://doi.org/10.1002/0471264385.wei1204
245. [a38] Yasuda, Y.; Takahashi, N. 2007. "Isomorphism and Legitimacy: Reading DiMaggio and Powell (1983)" *Akamon Management Review*, 6(9): 425–434. https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/amr/6/9/6_060903/_pdf
246. [a39] Wakuta, Y. 2015. "The Significance and Problems of Neo-Institutional Organization Theory" *Mita Business Review*, 58(2): 227–237. https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AN00234698-20150600-0227
247. [e45] Yorozui, T. 2025. "The Meaning of the 'Commission Contract' for Part-Time University Lecturers: On the Osaka District Court Judgment of 30 January 2025" *Ryukoku Law Review*, 58(2): 237–239.

### Primary sources reached in the second round (cited above)

248. [p01] American Association of University Professors. 1940 (with 1970 Interpretive Comments). "1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure." aaup.org returns 403 on every path; confirmed through a university page reproducing the full text. https://humanresources.illinois.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/AAUP_1940Statement_PriciplesonAcademicFreedomandTenure_PC_2_AY23-24.pdf
249. [p02] American Association of University Professors. 1915. "General Declaration of Principles." https://aaup-ui.org/Documents/Principles/Gen_Dec_Princ.pdf
250. [p03] Hochschullehrerbund (hlb). 2025. "Infoblatt: Hausberufungen" (article numbers for Hausberufung provisions across all sixteen German states, as of 2025-09-01). https://www.hlb.de/fileadmin/hlb-global/downloads/members_only/Infoblaetter_Mitglieder/hlb-Infoblatt_Hausberufungen.pdf
251. [p04] Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Japan), Council for Science and Technology. "Trends and Issues in Personnel-Training System Reform under the Program for Promoting the Independent Research Environment of Young Researchers." https://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/gijyutu/gijyutu10/siryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/08/18/1350742_03.pdf
252. [p05] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. 2026. "Rescission of Executive Order 11246 Implementing Regulations" *Federal Register* (FR Doc 2026-17114, published 2026-08-21, effective 2026-10-26). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/08/21/2026-17114
253. [p06] U.S. Department of Labor. 2004. "Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Backlog Reduction" *Federal Register*, 69 FR 43716 (Interim Final Rule, 2004-07-21). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2004-07-21/pdf/04-16536.pdf
254. [p07] Lov om universiteter og høyskoler (universitets- og høyskoleloven), § 6-3 (Norway). https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLO/lov/2005-04-01-15/KAPITTEL_1-6
255. [p08] Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals. 1989. *Utah State University*, 1988-INA-115 (en banc, 1989-04-05). https://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/INA/REFERENCES/CASELISTS/BALCA_DECISIONS.HTM
256. [p09] Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench. 1973. Mitsubishi Jushi case (Case No. 1968 (O) 932, judgment of 12 December 1973, Minshu 27-11-1536) `[要一次検証]`. courts.go.jp could not be reached in this session; the holding was confirmed verbatim at https://www.cc.kyoto-su.ac.jp/~suga/hanrei/8-3.html


## Unverified Items

Every item marked `[要出典確認]` or `[要一次検証]`, collected in one place. Per-row footnotes remain in the internal corpus tables. Items closed by the second round (2026-08-22, 185 searches across five assignments) are folded away as closed.

### Constraints affecting the whole map

1. **Even after two rounds of verification, few sources were read beyond the abstract.** For Strand B the formulations of four classics rest on agreement among secondary sources; for Strand D, five of seven Japanese-language books could be reached neither in full text nor through a peer-reviewed review.
2. **Effect sizes and sample sizes appear on only a minority of rows.** To avoid fabrication, quantities that could not be confirmed were left out.
3. (Closed) The constraint that no WebSearch was run during collection. 185 searches across five assignments were run the same day, and all seven areas previously marked unexplored have now been searched.

### Sought exhaustively and still not found

Since keyword search was run and returned nothing, these are treated as probably absent rather than unexplored.

4. **Empirical work applying Freidson's collegial control to academic recruitment.** The core hypothesis for Q2-3, not found in either round. Ganuza and Salö (x02) support it from the closure side.
5. **Studies measuring the fair process effect in academic searches** (Q1-3). Applicant-reaction research on the general labor market is abundant; nothing applies the frame explicitly to academic recruitment.
6. **Quantitative measurement of speaking time or influence within committees.** General small-group social psychology exists; nothing targets search committees. Jain and Miller (x07, effects of decision rules) and Musselin and Pigeyre (x08, qualitative analysis of deliberation) are the closest substitutes.
7. **Peer-reviewed Japanese work on applicants' perceptions.** The search returned only personal blogs and note posts.
8. The transferability judgments for the fifteen factors in the Strand C theory map are hypotheses of this map; no study tests them. Q2-6 (adverse selection) and Q2-9 (firm-specific human capital) lack empirical grounding in their academic versions.

### Primary legal and institutional documents not reached

9. **The BALCA decision *In re Cardinal Stritch University*.** dol.gov returns 403 and the OALJ search could not be run in either round. *University of Texas at Brownsville* (2010-PER-00887) was reached through practitioner commentary, and *Utah State University* (1988-INA-115) through the BALCA decision list, a primary page.
10. **56 FR 54920** (1991, amending 20 CFR 656.21a): the preamble verbatim. archives.federalregister.gov returns 403 and the govinfo PDF would not yield text.
11. **The Public Law number of the 1976 INA amendment** that created special handling. Practitioner accounts agree; no primary source was reached.
12. **courts.go.jp itself.** Both the Mitsubishi Jushi and Popolo cases return 404 on every detail2 and asset id. The holdings were confirmed at a university-hosted case database; the citations Minshu 27-11-1536 and Keishu 17-4-370 rest on agreement among legal-publishing sources.
13. The recruitment provisions of the CAO Nederlandse Universiteiten, the professorial advertising provisions of the Finnish Yliopistolaki, the Danish Ansættelsesbekendtgørelsen itself, and the article establishing the general advertising duty in the Swedish Högskoleförordningen.
14. The promulgation date of Imperial Ordinance No. 82 of 1893 and the text of the chair-system provision itself. The archival title was identified at the National Archives of Japan.
15. The commencement date of the 2022 amendment to the Standards for the Establishment of Universities; the elided portion of Article 2 of the Special Act on Education Public Service Personnel; whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Act guideline has been amended since 2015; the day of the cabinet decision on the First Science and Technology Basic Plan (the month is settled).
16. The verbatim JREC-IN posting requirement in the Leading Initiative for Excellent Young Researchers (the document and its title were confirmed; the PDF would not yield text). **For KAKENHI itself no official document requiring a JREC-IN posting was found**, which is not asserted as absence.
17. On 20 CFR 656.21a and the Immigration Act of 1990, **two premises in the commissioning brief were wrong.** 69 FR 43716 is not the 2004 PERM final rule but the Backlog Reduction interim final rule; the PERM final rule is 69 FR 77326, already in the corpus. IMMACT90 § 122 concerns an unrelated pilot program for determining labor shortages and surpluses.

### Individual sources unread or with unsettled bibliography

18. **How the Japanese-language books in Strand D state the causal link between the chair system and designated succession remains unsettled.** Only Ushiogi's *The Challenge of Kyoto Imperial University* (d10) was pinned down, through a peer-reviewed review, and even there the causation is structural in a broad sense: saturation of chair-system posts pushed surplus qualified scholars toward newly founded universities, which is not designated succession within one institution. Amano (d08, d09), Ushiogi (d11), Terasaki (d12), and Nakayama (d13) could be reached neither in full text nor through a scholarly review.
19. **The four classics in Strand B rest on agreement among secondary sources.** Weber's chapter and page (b01) were settled from the UC Press table of contents (Vol. 1, Part One, Ch. I, § 10 "Open and Closed Relationships," p. 43), but Parkin's exclusion and usurpation (b02), Murphy's three levels (b03), and Tilly's four mechanisms (b04) were not reached in the originals.
20. Page ranges for e16 and e17, the number of interviews in e56, quantified effect sizes and p-values in e63, the direction and magnitude of the finding in b21, the verbatim definitions of the sub-tactics in a13, and the chapter text of a34.
21. In the sister corpus, en19 (Lane 2024): **the Wiley article page itself gives only "C. Lane."** Several independent secondary sources agree on Cassandra Lane at the University of Newcastle, but the university profile returns 403. **The primary form is "C. Lane."**

### Proposed corrections to the sister note

22. (Closed) The authorship of en16. The Crossref API establishes four authors, McCambly, H.; Liera, R.; Rodgers, A. J.; Park, B., and the "Park, B. sole author" form was corrected in the sister note and the corpus (2026-08-22).

### Corrections to this map itself

23. **The second round found 19 items whose bibliography or argument had been recorded wrongly**, two of which dissolve the claim they supported. **Item d24 studies administrative-manager appointments at national universities, not faculty appointments**, and never mentions the share of open searches. **Item d19 (the Arimoto volume) records changes in academic attitudes, not chair systems, recruitment, or succession.** Neither can serve as evidence for Q2. On the theory side, reading Kossinets and Watts (b31) as settling whether homophily is structural or preferential was the wrong question: their conclusion is that choice and induced homophily interact dynamically and amplify across generations. The central finding in van den Brink (e54) is likewise not "a description of how open and closed procedures are used" but that recruitment by invitation from male scouts is the dominant pattern.