From This Is Heavy to That Person Is Incompetent

A design for examining the claim that “incompetence in modern knowledge work means raising other people’s cognitive load; people who cannot self-regulate or self-correct raise others’ load and are treated as incompetent; raw processing ability barely matters” by describing the field rather than by measuring it. The prior literature review (competence-as-cognitive-load) split the claim into parts and checked how far the empirical work reaches. This note continues from there. Based on 45 methodological sources and 45 prior field studies and analytic frameworks. Full bibliographic details appear in the References below. The internal corpora are at source/review/cognitive-load-competence/qualitative-method.md and source/review/cognitive-load-competence/fieldwork-precedents.md (repository-internal, not published).

The previous inquiry reached a dead end

When the claim was split in three and put to the evidence, the part that looked most tractable was “are treated as incompetent.” It predicts a social fact, so it ought to be checkable.

When Rotundo and Sackett had 504 North American managers rate hypothetical employees, the raters fell into three groups. Those who weighted task performance most heavily, those who weighted harm to others most heavily, and those who weighted both about equally. The assumption that raters evaluate alike was contradicted by the data.

That much still leaves a way forward. If you could predict which group you would draw, you could specify the conditions under which the claim holds.

It could not be predicted. The clusters did not divide by organization, and showed no significant differences by age, education, or background.

This is not a refutation of the claim. It is a dead-end sign on the route that would settle the claim by measuring it. The judgment is not sitting outside as a fact waiting to be measured. It is made on the spot, where someone is watching someone else.

So: stop measuring, and go watch the making.

Not defining the concepts first

The moment a study announces it will be qualitative, most designs continue like this. Define cognitive load as “time spent by others on checking and correcting, plus subjective burden,” define self-correction as “time from comment to completed fix and the recurrence count of the same class of comment.” Then code the interview transcripts, group the codes into categories, and build themes.

That is measurement wearing qualitative clothes. Fixing the concepts first and pouring the field’s words into the mold is, in what it actually does, no different from building a scale.

In 1954 Herbert Blumer called concepts of this type definitive concepts: concepts with operational definitions and clear indicators, whose function is to judge whether a case falls under the definition. His objection was that the social world does not hold still for them. The same “unrest,” the same “solidarity,” appears differently in each setting. Fix the definition first and you see only the part that fits it; the rest is discarded as noise.

Against that he set sensitizing concepts. A sensitizing concept is not an instrument for deciding what falls under it. It only indicates which way to look. And each encounter with a case rewrites the concept itself.

Holding “cognitive load” as a sensitizing concept in this study means the following. Do not decide, before entering the field, what load is. Without deciding, attend to occasions where someone experiences someone else’s work as heavy. Whether that heaviness turns out to be about time, about broken concentration, about the weariness of repeating the same explanation, or about something else entirely, is what the field will tell you.

Blumer has critics. In 1979 Martin Bulmer objected that sensitizing concepts only point, that the procedure for applying them is vague, and that concept formation should be worked into something more concrete. In 1989 Martyn Hammersley argued that Blumer’s methodology carries an internal tension: how far can a position hold together that criticizes quantitative method while advocating naturalistic inquiry?

These criticisms are not dismissed here. Whatever is loosened in procedure comes back as the writer’s burden of accounting for what was seen. That burden is taken up later in this note.

What to watch for is a switch in vocabulary

This study is looking for one turning point.

“This work is heavy” is a statement about work. “That person is incompetent” is a judgment about a person. In the move from the first to the second, the topic shifts from work to person, and a one-time event becomes an attribute of someone.

Of what the prior review established, the finding closest to this turning point came from Kennedy and colleagues in 2008. They observed how supervising physicians decide whether a trainee can be trusted to work unsupervised, spending 216 hours in the midst of clinical activity and conducting short interviews with 88 supervisors. What they found was that the judgment depends heavily on how the trainee talks. Not on what the trainee can do, but on what they say, and how. How they declare their own limits, how they present what they do not know: that was what was being read.

What Yeates and colleagues described in 2013 is the mechanism by which that reading diverges between raters. Watching the same recorded consultation, what draws the eye differs in the first place. So does how the criteria get assembled in the head. The three clusters Rotundo and Sackett saw in numbers look like this from the inside.

What Govaerts and colleagues picked up in 2013 with think-aloud protocols is more direct still. Experienced raters were looking through a schema of the person; less experienced raters through schemas of the task. Whether someone is seen as a person or as a piece of work shifts with the rater’s own expertise.

These are studies in medical education, but the turning point they handle is the same one.

The researcher does not define “incompetent”

The claim contains the word “incompetent.” How that word is handled decides the character of the study.

If the researcher defines it, what remains is the work of judging who falls under the definition. The study then adds one more judgment instead of describing the field’s.

The membership categorization device that Harvey Sacks formulated in 1972 offers a different handling. When people call someone by a category, expectations about what such a person can be expected to do are attached to it. What Sacks showed repeatedly is that the category is not the analyst’s instrument but a device the people in the setting are themselves using.

In this study, “incompetent” is not something the researcher defines but something watched in use. When someone calls another person “the one who doesn’t get it,” “high-maintenance,” “someone you have to keep an eye on,” those labels carry expectations about what should be manageable. The content of those expectations is drawn out of the occasions where the labels are used.

Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology points the same way. Describe not the researcher’s analytic categories but the methods the members themselves employ. And what Garfinkel and Wieder set out as the unique adequacy requirement is that describing those methods demands the researcher know the setting well enough to carry out its activities. To describe a design critique or a code review, one has to be able to read what is at issue in that review.

This requirement does not push toward more procedure on the researcher’s side. It pushes toward spending longer in the field.

Where to enter, and what to sit in on

The turning point of interest surfaces most densely wherever one person inspects another’s work. Design critiques, code reviews, manuscript reviews, handoffs. Each is a setting where someone looks at someone else’s work and asks for changes.

It is worth noting how much prior work actually entered. Rivera described hiring at elite professional service firms through 120 interviews and nine months of participant observation inside a recruiting department. Lamont followed twelve funding panels over two years and sat in on the deliberations of three. Bechky spent about a year in a semiconductor equipment plant.

The order of magnitude is clear. Weekly observation with the same team over six months to a year is the floor.

Three kinds of occasion are worth attending. One is the review itself. Another is what gets said afterward, to someone who was not there. “They did the same thing again” is the complaint in which a judgment takes shape. The third is where assignments and evaluations are decided. When it is settled who will be paired with whom and what comes next, the judgments accumulated so far get used.

Interviews go to both the judging side and the judged side. One side alone loses the core of this study. As the prior review established, whoever judges “other people’s cognitive load” is always the party on whom the load fell, and the judgment issues from an asymmetric position.

In handling that asymmetry, the old argument that actors and observers attribute causes differently looks ready to hand. Before reaching for it, one has to note that Malle’s 2006 meta-analysis of 173 studies found the effect size for this asymmetry close to zero. It appeared only under limited conditions, such as when free-response accounts were coded, or with negative events. So the asymmetry is not carried in as a premise; whether it appears in this setting is something to watch for.

Reading without coding

Once records accumulate, the usual procedure runs like this. Read the transcripts, cut them into units of meaning, attach codes, group codes into categories, build themes from categories. Then check whether multiple analysts attach the same code to the same passage, and report the agreement rate.

Braun and Clarke argue that this last step is theoretically incompatible with reflexive thematic analysis. Agreement means something if there is a correct pattern in the data waiting to be found and the analyst is an instrument for reading it accurately. If interpretation is made through the analyst’s position and reading, two readings coinciding is no evidence of quality. Coincidence shows only that the two shared a frame beforehand.

So what is done instead of coding?

What Jack Katz argued across his two-part paper in 2001 and 2002 is that the quality of the description itself carries the inference. When a scene is well written, the reader understands what is happening in it. That understanding includes an inference about why it came about. Making the description and making the explanation are not separable into distinct stages.

Laurel Richardson’s claim that writing is a method of inquiry points the same way. Only by writing does it become clear what was seen. The report is not composed after the analysis is over.

So analysis in this study is the work of rewriting scenes. Take a scene noted in the fieldnotes and rewrite it so that what happened becomes legible. In the course of rewriting, what was at issue in that scene comes into view. What comes into view becomes the handle for rereading another scene. The back-and-forth that Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw describe as the practical craft of fieldnotes is exactly this.

What is offered in place of an agreement rate? The scene itself, with enough thickness that the reader can read it independently. The conversation in which a judgment was born, given as an exchange rather than as a summary. And then, an account of how that scene was read. Leaving room for the reader to read it otherwise is what honesty amounts to here.

When Sandelowski wrote in 1993 of “rigor or rigor mortis,” the target was a rigor borrowed from quantitative criteria that stiffens qualitative work. Barbour’s 2001 point that checklist-driven technical fixes do not secure rigor names the same thing.

Reframing the question of how many

In qualitative research proposals, no question is handled more formulaically than this one. Write “until saturation” and it usually passes.

Braun and Clarke doubt the concept of saturation itself. To call the state where nothing new appears “saturation” requires believing that the total of what can be found in the data is fixed. If interpretation is made through reading, something new can appear each time the same data is reread. Saturation risks becoming another name for the point at which reading stopped.

Mario Small asked something adjacent in 2009. If the question of how many cases arises from a concern with statistical representativeness, that concern does not deliver what qualitative research is after. What is needed is to ask which case, seen next, would put the current understanding to the test.

This study does not fix a count in advance. After describing several occasions on which judgments were born, the description is tested against how far it carries in other settings. Where it fails to carry becomes the next material. The criterion for choosing where to go next is not representativeness but whether the current understanding is likely to break there.

A setting where confusing others is part of the job during exploratory work, for instance, is a place where the claim should not hold as stated. Watching how judgment works there puts the understanding to the test.

How this design could fail

Several shapes of failure are visible in advance.

One is that the turning point never surfaces where it can be observed. If the conversion from “heavy” to “incompetent” happens only in undocumented small talk or in private thought rather than in the meeting room, sitting in will not reveal it. The fallback would be reconstructing it retrospectively through interviews, and the quality of description would drop.

Another is that judgment is suppressed by the researcher’s presence. Negative judgments about persons are not readily voiced in front of an outsider. Long attendance thins this somewhat; it does not remove it.

A third is arriving at the end still holding only sensitizing concepts. Holding “cognitive load” without defining it enriches the description at the cost of being able to state what was found. Bulmer’s criticism lands here. It is entirely possible to finish with a collection of scenes rather than an advance in understanding.

A fourth is that the study becomes a judging apparatus itself. A study describing how the judgment “that person is incompetent” gets made, which in its own descriptions renders someone as an incompetent person, is doing the very thing it criticizes. Anonymization is not enough. Whether the judged side’s account is written with the same thickness as the judging side’s is the marker of whether this failure was avoided.

The objection to staying with description

The strongest objection to this design is that description alone does not contribute to theory.

That dissatisfaction is exactly what led Snow, Morrill, and Anderson to propose “analytic ethnography” in 2003. Interpretive ethnography renders scenes well, but concepts do not get refined and theory does not get extended. They explicitly require the work of linking fieldwork to theory.

Two replies, in two directions.

The first is to use Katz’s argument again. When a scene is well written, an understanding of the mechanism is already in it. If the text makes legible why this person came to be called “the one who doesn’t get it,” that is a description of the mechanism. Naming a concept is not the only way to theorize.

The second concerns where this study sits. The prior literature review found no study that directly measures the causal pathway at the heart of the claim. Before measuring, no one knows what is going on. The context in which Blumer proposed sensitizing concepts was the same. Building concepts that can bear measurement requires having looked at the phenomenon first.

That said, this doubles as an escape route. Keep saying “we are still at the stage of looking at the phenomenon” and theory can be deferred indefinitely. Snow and colleagues’ demand is taken here as what closes that route off.

Who gets to see it

A study of judgments can put participants at risk. If who called whom “high-maintenance” can be reconstructed from the text, it damages the relationships in that setting.

Anonymization alone is insufficient. In small teams, a person is easily identified from role and scene. Mixing cases from several settings, shifting the timeline, altering details: each subtracts from the accuracy of the description, and what was subtracted has to be stated.

There is also the question of whether consent from the judged side can meaningfully be obtained. Some people, on learning that judgments about them are the object of study, are in no position to refuse. How to construct a real option to refuse has to be worked out setting by setting.

Unverified items

• Whether the conversion from “heavy” to “incompetent” surfaces on observable occasions. If it does not, the center of the design does not hold [requires primary verification]
• Whether settings that permit attendance where judgments are made can actually be found. Places where evaluation happens are usually closed to outsiders [to be confirmed]
• Whether the actor-observer asymmetry in attribution appears in settings of this kind. Malle’s meta-analysis does not support a universal asymmetry [requires primary verification]
• How far self-repair in conversation analysis (rewording an utterance) and self-correction as the claim means it (improving how one works) can be handled within one framework [requires primary verification]
• Japanese-language primary research on why a given behavior gets read as low ability. Multiple queries failed to confirm any [citation to be confirmed]
• Instances where research using sensitizing concepts advanced understanding beyond description, which would answer Snow and colleagues with a case [citation to be confirmed]
• DOIs for Geertz (1973), Garfinkel & Wieder (1992), and Sacks (1972, in Sudnow) — all book chapters, possibly without one [citation to be confirmed]
• The DOI for Kennedy et al. (2008), and the detailed collection figures for Bechky (2003) and Rivera (2011) [requires primary verification]

References

How concepts are held

1. Blumer, H. (1954). What is Wrong with Social Theory? American Sociological Review, 19(1), 3–10. https://doi.org/10.2307/2088165
2. Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Prentice-Hall. ISBN 9780138799243
3. Bulmer, M. (1979). Concepts in the Analysis of Qualitative Data. The Sociological Review, 27(4), 651–677. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1979.tb00354.x
4. Hammersley, M. (1989). The Dilemma of Qualitative Method: Herbert Blumer and the Chicago Tradition. Routledge. ISBN 9780415017718

Description and interpretation

5. Geertz, C. (1973). Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture. In The Interpretation of Cultures (pp. 3–32). Basic Books. [citation to be confirmed: no DOI for the original]
6. Katz, J. (2001). From How to Why: On Luminous Description and Causal Inference in Ethnography (Part 1). Ethnography, 2(4), 443–473. https://doi.org/10.1177/146613801002004001
7. Katz, J. (2002). From How to Why: On Luminous Description and Causal Inference in Ethnography (Part 2). Ethnography, 3(1), 63–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/1466138102003001003
8. Richardson, L. (2000). Writing: A Method of Inquiry. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research (2nd ed., pp. 923–948). Sage. [citation to be confirmed: pagination varies by edition]
9. Van Maanen, J. (1988). Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226849621
10. Emerson, R. M., Fretz, R. I., & Shaw, L. L. (1995). Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226206691
11. Snow, D. A., Morrill, C., & Anderson, L. (2003). Elaborating Analytic Ethnography: Linking Fieldwork and Theory. Ethnography, 4(2), 181–200. https://doi.org/10.1177/14661381030042002

The field’s own categories

12. Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice-Hall. ISBN 9780745600055
13. Garfinkel, H., & Wieder, D. L. (1992). Two Incommensurable, Asymmetrically Alternate Technologies of Social Analysis. In G. Watson & R. M. Seiler (eds.), Text in Context: Contributions to Ethnomethodology (pp. 175–206). Sage. [citation to be confirmed: DOI]
14. Garfinkel, H. (2002). Ethnomethodology’s Program: Working Out Durkheim’s Aphorism (A. W. Rawls, ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 9780742516427
15. Sacks, H. (1972). An Initial Investigation of the Usability of Conversational Data for Doing Sociology. In D. Sudnow (ed.), Studies in Social Interaction (pp. 31–74). The Free Press. [citation to be confirmed: DOI]
16. Sacks, H. (1992). Lectures on Conversation, Vols. I & II (G. Jefferson, ed.). Blackwell. ISBN 9781557867056
17. Kitamura, T. (2025). Inquiring into the Order of Category Use: Membership Categorization Analysis. Tokai Law Review, 68. https://researchmap.jp/Takanori_Kitamura/published_papers/49284430/attachment_file.pdf
18. Schegloff, E. A., Jefferson, G., & Sacks, H. (1977). The Preference for Self-Correction in the Organization of Repair in Conversation. Language, 53(2), 361–382. https://doi.org/10.1353/lan.1977.0041
19. Scott, M. B., & Lyman, S. M. (1968). Accounts. American Sociological Review, 33(1), 46–62. https://doi.org/10.2307/2092239

Where analysis sits

20. Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2019). Reflecting on reflexive thematic analysis. Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health, 11(4), 589–597. https://doi.org/10.1080/2159676X.2019.1628806
21. Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2021). One size fits all? What counts as quality practice in (reflexive) thematic analysis? Qualitative Research in Psychology, 18(3), 328–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/14780887.2020.1769238
22. Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2021). Can I use TA? Should I use TA? Should I not use TA? Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 21(1). https://doi.org/10.1002/capr.12360
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26. Barbour, R. S. (2001). Checklists for improving rigour in qualitative research: a case of the tail wagging the dog? BMJ, 322(7294), 1115–1117. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7294.1115
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Choosing cases, and criteria for quality

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31. Tracy, S. J. (2010). Qualitative Quality: Eight “Big-Tent” Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research. Qualitative Inquiry, 16(10), 837–851. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800410383121
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Prior field studies

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39. Govaerts, M. J. B., van de Wiel, M. W. J., Schuwirth, L. W. T., van der Vleuten, C. P. M., & Muijtjens, A. M. M. (2013). Workplace-Based Assessment: Raters’ Performance Theories and Constructs. Advances in Health Sciences Education, 18(3), 375–396. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10459-012-9376-x
40. Hauer, K. E., Oza, S. K., Kogan, J. R., Stankiewicz, C. A., Stenfors-Hayes, T., ten Cate, O., Batt, J., & O’Sullivan, P. S. (2015). How Clinical Supervisors Develop Trust in Their Trainees: A Qualitative Study. Medical Education, 49(8), 783–795. https://doi.org/10.1111/medu.12745
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43. Lamont, M. (2009). How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment. Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674054158
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Frameworks for reading judgment

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