Does Design Need Its Own Epistemology, and Can Philosophy Be Done by Design? (Reading Two 2026 Texts)

Two texts published in 2026 both stand close to the word “designerly,” but they appear to point in opposite directions. Digby argued that no separate epistemology is needed to explain knowledge in design (Digby 2026). The publisher’s description of the volume edited by Secomandi and Verbeek proposed reinterpreting design philosophy as “a designerly way of doing philosophy” (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026). One text gives up a form of knowledge peculiar to design, and the other seems to carry a way of working peculiar to design into philosophy.

In What Is the Philosophy of Design? (Academic Research), these two texts were each given one sentence, based on an abstract and a publisher’s description. Reading the full texts shows that the two do not cite each other and that Digby’s reference list shares no single work with the reference lists of the two chapters written by the editors. Whether they actually collide, or simply answer different questions, cannot be decided without examining how each argument is built.

What was read, and to what extent

Digby 2026 is a paper presented at DRS2026 (Edinburgh, 8–12 June). The PDF in the DRS Digital Library (17 pages) was opened in Chrome and read in full; the same URL returns HTTP 403 when fetched with curl. According to the author note, Digby is an Irish landscape architect who researches the epistemology of design (Digby 2026). Section numbers below refer to the sections of the paper.

Secomandi and Verbeek 2026 is an 11-chapter volume published by Bloomsbury Visual Arts and available open access under CC BY. The introductory chapter (pp. 3–22) and the closing chapter (pp. 197–200), both written by the two editors, were read in full on Bloomsbury Collections (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026a, 2026b). The manuscript of the launch talk that Secomandi gave at the TU Delft Library on 29 May 2026, posted on OSF, was also read (Secomandi 2026).

The source of the phrase became clear only from the full text. The phrase “a designerly way of doing philosophy” does not appear in the editors’ own prose in the introductory or the closing chapter. In the body of the book, the phrase is used in Chapter 7, written by Eggink and Dorrestijn (Eggink and Dorrestijn 2026). The introductory chapter quotes the phrase in the paragraph that introduces Chapter 7 (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026a, §5). The publisher’s description presents the phrase as the editors’ claim (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026). This note therefore treats the editors’ claims (the introductory and closing chapters) separately from the source of the phrase (Chapter 7). From Chapter 7, only the introductory paragraph in which the phrase appears and the concluding section were read.

What does Digby claim, and how does he argue?

Claim

According to Digby, design epistemology has long been divided by dualities such as science versus art and rationality versus intuition, but these are false dichotomies (Digby 2026, abstract). Critical Rationalism, the position of Popper and Deutsch that knowledge is fallible conjecture and progresses not through justification or verification but through creative conjecture and error-correction by criticism, is a general account of knowledge creation that explains the distinctive aspects of design “without requiring a distinct epistemology for design” (§1). In the conclusion, Digby states that designing is problem-solving and that designs can be understood as explanatory theories about how to solve problems (§6).

Steps of the argument

The argument proceeds in seven steps.

1. Starting diagnosis: Digby summarizes Jones and colleagues (2016) as identifying the absence of a shared philosophical foundation beneath the divisions (no consensus on scope, method, or validation), and Galle (2018) as arguing that, without greater philosophical rigor, design risks oscillating between reductionist scientism and ungrounded relativism (§1).
2. Criticism of existing accounts: Cross’s (1982) designerly ways of knowing, Schön’s (1983) reflective practice, and Dorst and Cross’s (2001) co-evolution of problem and solution describe important features of design activity, but do not explain the mechanism by which knowledge is created (§1). Accounts that treat design as an iterative cycle, such as co-evolution and Lawson’s generator–test cycle, say what designers do without explaining why the process leads to genuine improvement rather than mere change (§2).
3. Six principles: Digby summarizes Critical Rationalism in six principles: realism, fallibilism, problems, creativity, criticism, and explanation (§2).
4. Application to design: A design brief is an attempted description of a problem situation, which includes background knowledge, unstated constraints, and conflicting assumptions (§2.3). No one can explain how conjectures are created, but conjectures are not derived from evidence; they are created by rearranging and altering existing ideas (§2.4). Sketches, models, and prototypes are visible guesses about how a problem might be solved (§2.4). Criticism is an attempt at problem-solving rather than fault-finding, and a criticism of a design implies an alternative in which the error is absent (§2.5). A good design, like a good explanation in Deutsch’s sense, is “hard to vary”: its parts fit the problem so tightly that altering any of them weakens the whole (§2.6).
5. Knowledge as physical information: Information is always instantiated in a physical substrate such as brains, conversations, drawings, models, or code. Externalizing ideas is therefore not merely communication but what makes ideas open to criticism and improvement (§3.1). Biological evolution, human knowledge, and computation share the pattern of copying, variation, and error-correction, and design is an instance of this pattern (§3.2, Table 1). Human knowledge creation is faster than biological evolution because both variation and error-correction are directed by explanatory understanding (§3.3). As an example, Digby cites Dyson’s conjecture that a cyclone would not lose suction and the thousands of prototypes that tested this conjecture (§3.3).
6. Comparison with other epistemologies: Pragmatism (Dewey, as presented by Dixon 2020) shares fallibilism, but lets the problem situation set the terms of solutions and thus ties the origin of new ideas to the situation (§4.1). Constructivism, under which Digby places Schön while acknowledging his Deweyan lineage, together with Krippendorff (1989), cannot explain why some constructions fail and others do not, and risks drifting toward relativism (§4.2). Phenomenology (the hermeneutics of Snodgrass and Coyne, and the architectural phenomenology of Norberg-Schulz and Pallasmaa) illuminates how meaning emerges in experience, but offers limited resources for explaining how explanatory knowledge about phenomena not yet experienced, such as the acoustic or structural behavior of a novel building geometry, is created (§4.3). All three locate the origin of knowledge in experience, practice, or the engagement of a subject with a situation, whereas in Critical Rationalism the origin is creativity and experience is where problems become visible and conjectures are tested (§4.4, Table 2).
7. Implications: Fallibilism makes appeals to authority epistemologically invalid (§5.1). In studio education, a critique should be treated as a conjecture rather than a final verdict, so that the student’s question shifts from “what does the tutor want?” to “what survives serious criticism?” (§5.1). The divide between rationalism and relativism is also a false dichotomy (§5.2). Research should generate rival conjectures and expose them to criticism rather than accumulate evidence for a preferred hypothesis (§5.3).

Evidence

The argument is conceptual and presents no new data. The collapsing bridge, the running shoe, Dyson’s prototypes, and the case from Dorst (2011) serve as illustrations. The propositions about studio education in §5.3 (for example, that students who understand fallibilism would show reduced anxiety about proposing ideas they cannot yet defend, and that students who understand criticism as necessary would respond with less defensiveness) are presented as untested conjectures, and Digby writes that an intervention study should specify in advance what evidence would count against each conjecture (§5.3).

Anticipated objections and how they are handled

Digby handles five objections in advance.

• Theory-ladenness of observation: That all observation is theory-laden is a consequence of realism, not a refutation of it. It explains why knowledge must be conjectural without implying that all conjectures are equally good (§2.1).
• Abduction: Dorst (2011) explained idea generation in design as abduction, which reasons backwards from a desired value. Digby reads Dorst’s own case differently: when the designers reframed the law-and-order framing of an entertainment quarter as a festival experience, they were not working backwards from the stated value but conjecturing that the stated value was wrong (§2.4). Reframing therefore conflicts with abductive logic, which treats the value as the one fixed known, and is expected in Critical Rationalism, which treats the entire problem situation, brief included, as conjectural (§2.4).
• Tacit knowledge: Polanyi’s knowledge that cannot be told is part of the background web of conjectures, and externalizing it through drawing, making, and dialogue makes it open to criticism (§2.4).
• Expertise: Expertise is valuable, but appeals to authority are invalid (§2.2, §5.1).
• Counter-intuitiveness: We do not feel the earth move beneath our feet, yet the best explanation is that it does. In the same way, knowledge may feel as though it flows in from experience, but theory comes first and experience tests it (§6).

Digby then calls the paper itself a fallible attempt and closes by asking readers to criticize it and identify its errors (§6).

Concepts used

What do Secomandi and Verbeek claim, and how do they argue?

Claim

The editors claim that design philosophy has undergone a technology turn over roughly the past two decades. Technology has become the central theme of investigation, and philosophical perspectives now come from the philosophy of technology proper rather than from applying the philosophy of science (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026a, §3). Beneath this claim lies a view of human beings. The editors write that the genesis of technologies through design is a fundamental part of human becoming, and that humans are “technologically mediated beings by design” (§1).

Steps of the argument

The introductory chapter proceeds through five sections: origins, landmarks, turns, dead ends, and pathways (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026a).

1. Origins: Starting from the Prometheus myth in Plato’s Protagoras, the editors argue that the technology of fire was not discovered as a gift from the gods but was designed by humans through the intentional rearrangement of given objects (§1). They place here Plessner’s view of humans as “artificial by nature,” Maldonado’s conception of design as progettazione, the concrete projection of consciousness, and Fry’s view that in using the technologies we design, we are reflexively shaped by our designs (§1).
2. Landmarks: Few philosophers have made design a central topic, and most philosophical encyclopedias have no entry on “design” (§2). As occasions on which design philosophy became thematic, the editors list the 2002 Design Studies special issue edited by Galle, Galle’s CEPHAD, the journal Design Philosophy Papers founded by Fry, Willis, and Dilnot (2003–2017), and the volumes edited by Vermaas and colleagues (§2). In most recent books and articles, including Parsons (2015), technology remains peripheral or only implicitly addressed (§2).
3. Turns: The first moment was the Design Methods movement, which used the conceptual framework of the philosophy of science and sought to establish design’s scientific credentials as an endeavor distinct from the established sciences (§3). The editors call this a demarcationist approach. In the 1980s, the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) altered this scenario by contesting the postpositivist standpoints that came from the philosophy of science (§3). The philosophy-of-science framing of design philosophy continues, but is increasingly limited to engineering, and Franssen and colleagues (2023) forcefully defend a philosophical analysis of technology that maintains “continuity with the philosophy of science” (§3). The editors then place the empirical turn in the philosophy of technology, which emerged from the Dutch technical universities, at the origin of the technology turn: the Delft School, rooted in analytic philosophy and focused on engineering design, and the Twente School, closer to continental philosophy and focused on the social implications of technologies and industrial design (§3). The ethical turn (Verbeek 2011) and the practical turn (Dorrestijn and Eggink 2018) are placed in the same line (§3).
4. Dead ends: The editors diagnose the distrust of technology in ontological design (Fry) and pluriversal design (Escobar) as rooted in the later Heidegger and reject it (§4). In its place, they invoke Hegel’s principle of mutual recognition: the formation of human self-consciousness leads to genuine freedom only when it is recognized by an opposite and equally self-conscious being (§4). They take Flusser’s view that objects of use are “mediations (media) between myself and other people” as a clue to the intersubjective nature of design (§4). Their conclusion is that humans are technologically mediated beings by design, “for and by an other,” and that only by forgetting this can we come to fear modern technology as if it possessed autonomous powers (§4). They support this with Vieira Pinto’s “scarecrow of technology” and with Maldonado’s statement that dissent which rejects hope in design is a subtle form of consent, and write that humans design technology to not go extinct, and that the ecological dilemma is that some people design it to secure their own future at the expense of others (§4).
5. Pathways: The editors introduce each chapter (§5). Chapter 2 by Koskinen and colleagues reviews doctoral constructive design research informed by pragmatism, phenomenology, and Marxism, and treats it as efforts to “design things philosophically.” Chapter 7 by Eggink and Dorrestijn proposes that the practical turn might involve cultivating “a designerly way of doing philosophy” (§5).

The closing chapter sets out future directions (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026b). The editors see a growing interpenetration of fields that moves beyond the philosophy of design in the sense of philosophy applied to design, taking the forms of design informed by philosophy, design-oriented philosophy, and even the design of philosophy. They then argue that a complementary design turn in the philosophy of technology is necessary, and recommend, in particular, that the philosophy of technology draw concepts of beauty, ornamentation, style, and taste from inquiries at the intersection of architecture, industrial design, and the fine arts (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026b).

Evidence

The editors’ argument rests on the genealogy of the literature and on the cases in the chapters of the volume. The introductory chapter uses a climate assessment (IPCC 2023) and archaeological findings on stone tools and fire as background, but presents no new data (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026a, §1, §4). The closing chapter names as a strength of the volume that many chapters are grounded in empirical cases of specific technologies (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026b).

Anticipated objections and how they are handled

• Technological pessimism: The Heideggerian fear of technology is answered with mutual recognition and with Maldonado’s critical but hopeful stance (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026a, §4).
• A lean toward technological optimism: In the closing chapter, the editors state their concern about the large socio-environmental costs of digital technologies, especially AI, and state that they are not advocating “Promethean techno-salvation.” They add that this critique should not come at the expense of rejecting technology and design altogether (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026b).
• The demand for continuity with the philosophy of science: The editors name Franssen and colleagues (2023) but do not develop a rebuttal. They limit themselves to emphasizing, with the phrase “philosophy of technology proper,” the autonomy of a field that does not reduce technological practice to applied science (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026a, §3).
• Bias: The editors acknowledge that the contributors came from 16 countries but from none of much of Asia or Africa, that the volume is weighted toward the Global North, and that many of its theoretical perspectives align with their own postphenomenological work (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026b).

Whose phrase is “a designerly way of doing philosophy”?

In Chapter 7, Eggink and Dorrestijn characterize the practical turn in two respects (Eggink and Dorrestijn 2026, introduction). “Designing things philosophically” is the testing of philosophical frameworks in real life, seen from the design research perspective. “A designerly way of doing philosophy” is the reflecting back on the implications for the philosophy of technology from the design cases. In the concluding section, they call the former “a particular approach,” citing Cross 2001, and write that the latter renders new knowledge comparable to the general practice of Research through Design (Findeli 2010) (Eggink and Dorrestijn 2026, §5). The word “designerly” in the phrase thus takes Cross’s term and moves it from a claim about a form of knowledge to the name of a method of doing philosophy.

A similar proposal exists outside the volume. Dixon 2023, which the editors cite in the introductory chapter, starts from Dewey’s proposal for a reconstruction in philosophy, treats Research through Design as a methodological bridge linking the asking of a question to its answering, and proposes undertaking philosophy in reference to things in experience (Dixon 2023). Dixon locates the origin of this idea in postphenomenological work (Dixon 2023, note 4).

Concepts used

Three points to check in Digby’s argument

From here on, the text is this note’s own examination. The first point is the attribution of the starting diagnosis. Digby writes that Jones and colleagues (2016) and Galle (2018) both identify the same structural problem, an oscillation between a rationalist pole and a relativist pole (Digby 2026, §1, §5.2). Jones and colleagues (2016) do describe two poles: a normative, logical, or scientific stance that produced reductive models, and a relativist, subjective stance that produced non-transferable theories (Jones et al. 2016, p. 297). In the full text of Galle 2018, however, none of the words “scientism,” “relativism,” or “oscillation” occurs, and Galle’s concern is that design research, if it borrows the methods and assumptions of other disciplines too eclectically, will lose its disciplinary identity (Galle 2018, §4.1). Galle 2018 also defines design research and design theory as specialized variants of the general definitions of research and theory, and writes that design theory differs from the general concept of theory only by specialization (Galle 2018, §4.1, §4.2). This is close to Digby’s conclusion that knowledge in design is an instance of knowledge in general. One of the works that Digby placed on the side of the diagnosis is thus close to the side of his conclusion.

The second point is the earlier debate. Whether design and science are the same kind of activity was debated in Design Studies between 2012 and 2015. Jones and colleagues (2016), whom Digby cites, name this debate (Farrell and Hooker; Galle and Kroes) and write that it is perhaps a symptom of the continuing lack of a foundation (Jones et al. 2016, p. 296). Digby himself, however, does not cite the debate. Galle and Kroes (2014) examined Farrell and Hooker’s claim that science and design are not different in kind, and criticized the perspective that treats both as intelligent problem-solving because, in Popper’s words, “All life is problem solving,” and every activity would then be reduced to one kind (Galle and Kroes 2014, conclusion). They then distinguished the two: science seeks a mind-to-world fit and design a world-to-mind fit; the theories of science are cognitive and descriptive, whereas the artifact proposals of design are practical and prescriptive; and truth is a central concern in evaluating a scientific theory, whereas it makes no sense to discuss the “truth” of a designer’s artifact proposal (Galle and Kroes 2014, conclusion). Digby’s proposition that designs are explanatory theories about how to solve problems, with reality as the final arbiter (Digby 2026, §4.2, §6), collides with this distinction. Digby’s paper contains no response to it.

The third point is the scope of the “phenomenology” that Digby compares. The phenomenology Digby examines is the hermeneutics of Snodgrass and Coyne and the architectural phenomenology of Norberg-Schulz and Pallasmaa (Digby 2026, §4.3). Postphenomenology, which addresses technological mediation, is not part of the comparison. The question of postphenomenology is how artifacts co-shape human perception and action (Verbeek 2006), which differs from the question of how knowledge is created. Therefore, the criticism in §4.3, that phenomenology offers limited resources for creating explanatory knowledge of phenomena not yet experienced, does not reach postphenomenology.

Where do the two texts conflict, and where are they compatible?

The two texts do not respond to each other. Digby’s paper (June 2026) does not cite the volume, and the introductory and closing chapters do not cite Digby. A comparison of the reference lists finds no work common to Digby and the two chapters by the editors. With Chapter 7, Digby shares only Dorst 2011, which Digby uses as a case in which reframing conflicts with abductive logic (§2.4), and which Chapter 7 cites as an example of deepening the understanding of design by applying abstract theory to design practice (Eggink and Dorrestijn 2026, §5). Cross appears in both, but Digby cites Cross 1982, the introductory chapter cites Cross 1984 as a work of the Design Methods movement, and Chapter 7 cites Cross 2001. Dixon also appears in both, but Digby cites Dixon 2020 (on Dewey and design), whereas the introductory chapter cites Dixon 2023a and 2023b.

The questions also differ in kind. Digby set out to answer an epistemological question: how does knowledge in design grow? The editors set out to answer a question about the history of the field and the shape of philosophy: how have design and philosophy intersected, and what is their central theme? Consequently, among the conflicts in the table below, rows 2 and 4 are cases in which the two texts give different answers to the same question, whereas rows 1, 3, and 5 are discrepancies that this note draws out by placing the two side by side.

There are three points of compatibility. The first is the view that design is fallible. Digby makes fallibilism a principle (§2.2). The editors likewise write that the habit of referring to the dominant technology of an age as a singular agency and indelible progress obscures the fundamentally collective, often contested, and potentially fallible nature of design (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026a, §4).

The second is the rejection of technological pessimism. Digby writes that design problems are soluble given the right knowledge, although we cannot be certain (§2.2). The editors reject the Heideggerian fear of technology and side with Maldonado’s stance, which does not abandon hope in design (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026a, §4). The grounds, however, differ. Digby’s optimism comes from a theory of the growth of knowledge. The editors’ optimism is tied to mutual recognition and to the political question of who designs for whom, and they explicitly disclaim techno-salvation (Secomandi and Verbeek 2026b). Row 4 of the table follows from this difference.

The third is testing ideas by making them into things. Digby argued that externalizing ideas in a physical substrate makes them open to criticism and improvement (Digby 2026, §3.1). In Chapter 7, “designing things philosophically” means testing philosophical frameworks in real life (Eggink and Dorrestijn 2026), and Dixon treated Research through Design as a methodological bridge between question and answer (Dixon 2023). The procedures are close, but the accounts of why the procedure produces knowledge diverge. Dixon’s proposal rests on Dewey’s theory of experience, whereas Digby rejected Dewey’s account, in which images of possible resolutions “flash upon us” from the problem situation, as tying the origin of ideas to the situation (Digby 2026, §4.1). In this note’s interpretation, “a designerly way of doing philosophy” can be reread within Digby’s frame as a procedure that makes philosophical conjectures into things and exposes them to criticism. On this reading, the two texts part ways at the level of the theory of knowledge that supports the procedure.

Relations to Cross, Schön, Galle, Love, Parsons, and postphenomenology

The last row contains one more parallel. Digby treats knowledge as information instantiated in a physical substrate (Digby 2026, §3), and Verbeek treated morality as materialized in things (Verbeek 2006). Both treat artifacts as carriers of what has been assumed to reside in human minds, namely knowledge and morality (this note’s interpretation). The difference is that Digby places artifacts under criticism as externalized conjectures, whereas Verbeek places artifacts under ethics as mediators that co-shape human perception and action.

Responses and citations have not yet appeared

As of 11 October 2026, OpenAlex and Semantic Scholar both reported 0 works citing Digby 2026. The volume had a citation count of 1 in OpenAlex, and the single citing work returned by Semantic Scholar was Gianni 2026, published in AI & Society. According to its reference list in Crossref, Gianni cites the volume as a whole and Chapter 2 by Koskinen and colleagues (Gianni 2026). The context of these citations could not be checked because the full text could not be retrieved. OpenAlex reported 0 works citing the introductory chapter, Chapter 7, or the closing chapter individually. Both texts are less than six months old, and the positioning in this note was therefore built from the works the two texts cite and from works that address the same question without being cited.

What this note could not confirm

Chapters 2 to 6 and 8 to 10 of the volume were not read. From Chapter 7, only the introductory paragraph in which the phrase appears and the concluding section were read. The full texts of Farrell and Hooker’s papers of 2012, 2013, and 2015 could not be retrieved, and their claims are treated only as summarized by Galle and Kroes (2014). The full text of Gianni 2026 could not be retrieved because the Springer page returned HTTP 403, and only the presence of the citations was checked through the reference list. The original works of Popper and Deutsch were not read, and the content of Critical Rationalism is treated only as summarized by Digby.

Related notes

• What Is the Philosophy of Design? (Academic Research): what the philosophy of design is (definition, origins, currents, and direction)
• The Epistemological Premises and Methodological Foundations of Design: A Literature Map of Wicked Problems, Abduction, and Set-Based Exploration: epistemological premises and methodological foundations of design (wicked problems, abduction, set-based exploration)
• What Has Design Education Carried So Far? (Academic Research): what design education has been responsible for (studio and critique; related to Digby’s proposal to treat critique as conjecture)

Unverified items

No unverified statements remain in the main claims. Digby 2026, the introductory and closing chapters, the relevant passages of Chapter 7, Secomandi 2026, Jones and colleagues 2016, Galle 2018, Galle and Kroes 2014, Dixon 2023, Cross 2001, Galle 2002, Love 2000, and Verbeek 2006 were checked in their full texts. The volume as a whole is treated only to the extent of the publisher’s description (used to check the attribution of the phrase). Gianni 2026 is treated only to the extent of its Crossref reference list (that it cites the volume and Chapter 2).

References

• Cross, Nigel. 2001. “Designerly Ways of Knowing: Design Discipline Versus Design Science.” Design Issues 17 (3): 49–55. https://doi.org/10.1162/074793601750357196
• Digby, JJ. 2026. “Does Knowledge in Design Require a Distinct Epistemology? A Critical Rationalist Perspective.” In DRS2026: Edinburgh, edited by L. Simeone et al. Design Research Society. https://doi.org/10.21606/drs.2026.1608
• Dixon, Brian. 2023. “Constructing a Reconstructed Philosophy: A Deweyan Philosophy-Through-Design.” Design Issues 39 (4): 77–88. https://doi.org/10.1162/desi_a_00738
• Eggink, Wouter, and Steven Dorrestijn. 2026. “Design × Philosophy: A Practical Turn in the Philosophy of Technology.” In Design Philosophy after the Technology Turn, edited by Fernando Secomandi and Peter-Paul Verbeek, 115–137. London: Bloomsbury Visual Arts. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350494480.ch-7
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• Galle, Per, and Peter Kroes. 2014. “Science and Design: Identical Twins?” Design Studies 35 (3): 201–231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.destud.2013.12.002
• Gianni, Robert. 2026. “AI Ethics after Generative AI: From Consequences to Effects.” AI & Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-026-03308-y
• Jones, Derek, Philip Plowright, Leonard Bachman, and Tiiu Poldma. 2016. “Introduction: Design Epistemology.” In Future-Focused Thinking: DRS International Conference 2016, edited by P. Lloyd and E. Bohemia. Design Research Society. https://doi.org/10.21606/drs.2016.619
• Love, Terence. 2000. “Philosophy of Design: A Meta-Theoretical Structure for Design Theory.” Design Studies 21 (3): 293–313. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0142-694X%2899%2900012-5
• Secomandi, Fernando. 2026. “Design Philosophy after the Technology Turn: A Promethean Reflection for Design Education.” OSF Preprints (SocArXiv). https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/4u2tb_v1
• Secomandi, Fernando, and Peter-Paul Verbeek, eds. 2026. Design Philosophy after the Technology Turn. London: Bloomsbury Visual Arts. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350494480
• Secomandi, Fernando, and Peter-Paul Verbeek. 2026a. “The Technology Turn in Design Philosophy: A Road Trip.” In Design Philosophy after the Technology Turn, 3–22. London: Bloomsbury Visual Arts. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350494480.ch-1
• Secomandi, Fernando, and Peter-Paul Verbeek. 2026b. “Next Frontiers for Design Philosophy after the Technology Turn: A Discussion.” In Design Philosophy after the Technology Turn, 197–200. London: Bloomsbury Visual Arts. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350494480.ch-11
• Verbeek, Peter-Paul. 2006. “Materializing Morality: Design Ethics and Technological Mediation.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 31 (3): 361–380. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243905285847