What Is a Playing Manager? Gains and Losses for the Appointee and the Appointing Side in Academic and Industry Sources

Do academic and industry sources look at the same thing?

When Japanese section managers (kacho) are asked what share of their work is work as a player, only 1.5% answer 0% (Sanno University Research Institute 2019). About half of their work is player work, and 59.0% of section managers report that it hinders their management work. In the United States as well, 97% of managers have individual contributor work and spend a median of 40% of their time on it (Gallup 2026a). In both countries, a person with subordinates who also carries hands-on work is not an exception.

However, a search of the academic literature for “playing manager” or “player-coach” returns almost no management research. In the collection for this note, most candidates retrieved with the two terms concerned player-managers in sports or unrelated uses of the words (source/review/playing-manager/papers.md). A form that is so common in industry surveys has no name in research. This raises the question of whether the gap is related to differences in how the gains and losses of playing managers are seen.

This note draws on 28 academic works (peer-reviewed articles, 2 working papers, 1 preprint, and Japanese articles and bulletins) and 41 industry sources. The industry sources consist of 11 documents from public bodies and international standards, 14 surveys by research firms, think tanks, and the institutes of human resource companies, and 16 first-hand statements and reports by executives and practitioners. Figures, quotations, and claims were checked against the relevant passages of the full text wherever the full text could be obtained. For papers whose full text could not be obtained, “abstract” is added after the year, and the claims are limited to what the abstract states (see Unverified items).

How does a playing manager differ from a player or a manager?

In this note, a playing manager is a manager who has subordinates and is responsible for their development, evaluation, and work allocation, while also doing the same kind of hands-on work as the subordinates and being responsible for its results. Japanese surveys define this operationally. Recruit Works Institute (2020) defined player work as “the same work that subordinates do” and reported that 12.7% of section managers do none of it. The section manager survey by Sanno University Research Institute asks managers to report the share of their work as a player in 10% steps from 0%, and it counts any answer other than 0% as combining the roles.

The difference from a pure player lies in the direction of responsibility. A player is responsible for his or her own results, whereas a playing manager is also responsible for the results and growth of subordinates. The difference from a pure manager lies in the allocation of time and the object of evaluation. A manager produces results through subordinates, whereas a playing manager also holds his or her own clients or individual targets. Hearings with 50 managers by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT) described this dual position as a state in which, in addition to developing and guiding subordinates (the role of a manager), the manager also holds clients and sales targets (the role of a player) (Ikezoe et al. 2022). One section manager stated, “If I do not clear my own quota, it is difficult to give advice to others, and I tend to give priority to my own assigned work” (ibid., case 12).

International standards treat this dual position through the distinction between managers and supervisors. The ILO companion guide to the International Standard Classification of Occupations states that supervisors are responsible only for supervising the activities of other workers, whereas managers have overall responsibility for the operations of an organizational unit (strategy, budgets, and the selection and dismissal of staff) (ILO 2023). Supervisors may advise on these matters, but they do not have the authority to decide. The guide also states that the primary skills of supervisors often concern the tasks performed by the staff they supervise, and that a part of their own work may involve the performance of these tasks. In international standards, therefore, doing the same work as subordinates can be part of the role of first-line supervision. The US occupational classification also separates first-line supervisors, who directly supervise and coordinate the activities of workers, from managers (BLS 2018)¹.

On the academic side, this form appears in four separate streams of research. The first is research on first-line managers. Hales (2005, abstract) reported, from a survey of 135 organizations in London and the South East of England, that the role of the first-line manager is stable, with a common performance-oriented supervisory core surrounded by additional managerial responsibilities. Changes had strengthened the supervisory core at least as much as they had broadened the role, and in some cases formerly middle management responsibilities had been added to the supervisory core to produce an extended first-line manager role. The second is research on hybrids, in which doctors and nurses also take managerial roles. Noordegraaf (2007, abstract) argued that professionalism in health care and social work shifts from “pure” to “hybrid,” and McGivern et al. (2015, abstract) distinguished, among doctor-managers in the British National Health Service, “incidental hybrids,” who protect their professionalism while temporarily in managerial roles, from “willing hybrids,” who develop an identity that integrates the two. The third is research on the effects of technically competent bosses (Artz et al. 2017), and the fourth is research on role ambiguity, conflict, and overload. In a literature review of Japanese managers, Sakazume (2020) described role overload as a form of role conflict that arises when demands on an individual’s time and energy are excessive.

What is new about the recent trend?

When people say that playing managers have recently become a trend, different things are happening in Japan and in the United States. In Japan, a long-standing condition came to be called by this name, whereas in US technology firms, executives adopted this form as a policy.

Since when have Japanese section managers combined the roles?

Japanese surveys indicate that the prevalence of playing managers is not a new phenomenon. In the 2000 survey by Recruit Works Institute, 82.3% of managers did player work (as cited by Sakazume 2020). Shiraishi (2008) reported that, in a 2007 company survey, 80% of section managers held individual targets as players and that more than half of their time was spent on player duties, and he wrote that having managers function as players “is already taken for granted in reality.”

Sakazume (2020) states that, from the first (2010) to the fifth (2019) section manager surveys by Sanno University, no change was observed in the share of work as a player, and that the most common band in every survey was 21 to 30%. Since then, the share of section managers combining the roles has been 99.2% in 2017, 98.5% in 2019, and 99.5% in 2021, and the weighted average share of player work was 49.1% in 2019 and 50.1% in 2021 (Sanno University Research Institute 2018, 2019, 2021). Among department managers (bucho), 96.9% combine the roles, and the weighted average rose from 39.9% in the previous survey to 43.9% (Sanno University Research Institute 2022). Because the definitions and populations differ by survey, the share of managers combining the roles ranges from about 70% (Recruit Management Solutions 2014) to 86.8% (NOMA 2026)². Under every definition, managers who also do hands-on work remain the majority.

Managers themselves explain the combination as a response to shortages. In Recruit Works Institute (2020), the most common reason was “because the workload is large and I need to join as a player” (57.3%), followed by “because subordinates lack capability and I need to join as a player” (37.3%) and “because the team’s performance targets for the period cannot be achieved unless I join as a player” (30.3%). Only 19.8% chose “because working as a player helps develop subordinates.” Sakazume (2020) reads these results as arising from shortages in both the number and the capability of subordinates.

Workstyle reform after 2018 shifted these shortages onto managers. In a survey by JMA Management Center (2019), 61.3% of managers reported that “my own workload has increased because of reductions in my subordinates’ overtime,” whereas only 31.8% of subordinates felt that “the burden has been shifted onto my boss.” In Persol Research and Consulting (2019), 62.1% of first-level managers in companies where workstyle reform was advanced reported that their own workload had increased, compared with 48.2% in companies where it was not. The JILPT hearings also pointed out that the burden of management work may have increased with the stricter time management that accompanied workstyle reform (Ikezoe et al. 2022).

The share of player work among Japanese managers is also high in international comparison. Using a five-country survey of managers by Recruit Works Institute, Kume and Nakamura (2020) reported that player work accounted for 39.0% of the work of Japanese section managers, and stated that, in relative terms, Japanese and Chinese managers spend more time on player work, whereas US managers spend more time on managing subordinates. The share of managers who answered “I am one of the employees” was 50.6% in Japan and 22.4% in the United States. The authors inferred that, in Japan, section managers and subordinates share long working hours and work in similar ways.

What did US technology firms change?

What happened recently in the United States is that executives publicly adopted, as policy, the removal of management layers and the expectation that managers also do hands-on work. In his “Year of Efficiency” letter, Meta’s Zuckerberg (2023) wrote that the company would remove multiple layers of management and ask many managers to become individual contributors. The stated reason was to make the flow of information between the people doing the work and management faster. Amazon’s Jassy (2024) asked each organization to increase the ratio of individual contributors to managers by at least 15% by the end of the first quarter of 2025, and in his letter to shareholders he wrote that managers can confuse themselves that the way to grow and get ahead is to accumulate large teams (Jassy 2025). Intel’s Tan (2025) told employees that the company would remove layers, increase spans of control, and stop treating team size as a key performance indicator for managers. Google was reported to have reduced the number of managers with fewer than three subordinates by 35%, with many of them staying on as individual contributors (Elias 2025).

Some firms wrote the term player-coach into their policies. In a letter to all employees, Coinbase’s Armstrong (2026) declared “No pure managers,” wrote that every leader must also be a strong and active individual contributor, and wrote that managers should be like player-coaches, getting their hands dirty alongside their teams. The same letter limits the organization to five layers below the CEO, states that leaders may have 15 or more direct reports, and also gives lower costs as a reason for removing layers. Block’s Dorsey (2026) called the role that corresponds to today’s managers a player-coach and described it as a person who, instead of telling people how to do something, shows them by doing the work. Fortune (Nusca 2026) ran this movement under the headline “The rise of the Silicon Valley player-coach.”

The figures show that spans of control are widening. In Gallup’s (2026a) self-reports by US managers, the average number of direct reports increased from 10.9 in 2024 to 12.1 in 2025, while the median remained at five to six and the rise in the average came from an increase in large teams. Gallup reports that 97% of managers have individual contributor responsibilities and spend a median of 40% of their time on them, and notes that such managers are often called “player-coaches.” Worldwide, manager engagement fell by nine points from 2022, and the largest drop was from 27% in 2024 to 22% in 2025 (Gallup 2026b). In the collection for this note, no first-hand analysis was found that shows trends in the share of job postings mentioning player-coach or playing manager. The claim that playing managers have increased cannot be confirmed directly with labor market time series.

Academic research recorded flattening itself earlier. Rajan and Wulf (2006, abstract) reported, from a panel of more than 300 large US firms, that the number of positions reporting directly to the CEO increased and the number of levels between division heads and the CEO decreased, and they stated that this change cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization. Littler et al. (2003, abstract) reported, from surveys of 2,964 organizations in three countries, that delayering in the 1990s was widespread and that managers’ commitment collapsed in Australia and South Africa. McCann et al. (2008, abstract) argued, from interviews with 64 people in five UK organizations that had undergone delayering and downsizing, that the performance of middle managers was monitored more closely, that their working hours and work intensity increased, and that their prospects for promotion shrank within flattened hierarchies. On the relationship between technology and span of control, Bloom et al. (2014) showed with firm data that information technologies such as ERP are associated with wider spans of control, whereas communication technologies are associated with less autonomy. For generative AI, there is a theoretical model in which the span of control first contracts and later expands as AI improves (Xu et al. 2025, preprint), and a quasi-experiment in which open source developers who gained access to GitHub Copilot shifted their work from project management toward coding (Hoffmann et al. 2024, working paper). No peer-reviewed study was found that measures the relationship between AI and the share of hands-on work among managers in firms.

What does the appointee gain and lose?

No study directly measures the gains and losses of the appointee. The following picture is assembled from research on promotion, combined roles, and roles in general, and from the answers and statements of managers themselves.

The first gain is continued involvement in hands-on work. Allen and Katz (1986, abstract) reported, from a survey of about 1,500 engineers and scientists in nine US organizations, that the proportion preferring more interesting technical work over either managerial or technical-ladder advancement increased strongly with age. For people who do not want to give up hands-on work, the combined role can be a way to combine promotion with that work. One engineering manager wrote that experienced engineers who have built careers as first-rate technical professionals want to keep contributing their skills to their teams even after becoming managers (kenichit 2023).

The second gain is a basis for earning the respect of subordinates. Kua (2015) of Thoughtworks stated that developers respect technical ability, and that by spending time in the code a tech lead earns that respect and maintains a true awareness of what is going on; he recommended spending at least 30% of the time coding. The third gain is that taking on additional roles does not necessarily harm one’s own performance. Day et al. (2004, abstract) reported, with longitudinal data on 201 captains in the National Hockey League, that players performed better in seasons in which they served as captain than in seasons in which they did not, even after controlling for performance in the previous season. The fourth gain is the gain from promotion itself. A longitudinal study of 184 people who took a first-time leadership position reported that tension increased at the time of the transition, but that emotional wellbeing and self-esteem then increased in a lasting way (Fletcher and French 2021, abstract). The monthly scheduled earnings of Japanese section-manager-level employees are 529.2 thousand yen, 1.7 times the 310.5 thousand yen of employees without a managerial position (MHLW 2026; the average age is 49.5 for section-manager level and 41.8 for non-managerial employees, so the difference includes differences in age and tenure). In the NOMA (2026) survey, 70.5% of managers reported a sense of fulfillment in their work.

The first loss is a lack of time. In Sanno University Research Institute (2019), 59.0% of section managers who do player work reported that it hinders their management work, and about 40% did not think they had been given sufficient authority. A JILPT survey reported that line section managers lack time overall, given their allocation between management and player work, and that more than 40% of managers showed signs of psychological distress (a K6 score of 5 or more) (JILPT 2022a). The average total monthly working hours of managers are 177.4 hours (JILPT 2021). A JILPT analysis of an individual survey listed the main causes of insufficient time for management as a large workload, staffing that does not match the workload, insufficient adjustment of workloads by one’s own supervisor, and taking over work that subordinates cannot do (JILPT 2022b). In the United Kingdom as well, 31% of managers, directors, and senior officials reported unpaid overtime (ONS 2022).

The second loss is role overload and conflict. Hutchinson and Purcell (2010, abstract) reported, from case studies in seven NHS trusts, that the roles of ward managers were extended to human resource duties and that the multiplicity of roles magnified role conflict and ambiguity, heavy workloads, and stress. Iwata (2015) reported, from a survey of 1,581 regular employees in Japan (832 of them managers), that role ambiguity and role conflict explained depressive reactions at most job levels.

The third loss is being pulled back to one’s own targets, and skills that are hard to maintain. The section manager quoted above said that he tends to give priority to his own quota (Ikezoe et al. 2022), and Larson (2020) wrote that people who try to fulfill both technical and management roles often retreat toward work they find familiar, becoming tech lead managers who forget to perform the management part. Larson consistently recommends against starting a management career in the tech lead manager role. Majors (2017), who moved from engineering to management, wrote that combining the two is an unstable arrangement because engineering skills and context-sharpness decay the longer one does it, and that one can only really improve at one of the two at a time. Majors wrote that the best frontline engineering managers are never more than two to three years removed from full-time hands-on work, and quoted Sarah Mei: “There are lots of people who do both well - but serially. Not simultaneously.” The combined role keeps involvement in hands-on work, but it is not necessarily a way to maintain skills.

The fourth loss is time to learn and, beyond it, motivation. In Persol Research and Consulting (2019), 63.0% of managers with a high burden could not secure time for learning (41.1% of those with a low burden), and 27.0% wanted to change jobs (20.0%).

The fifth loss is that the gains of promotion do not match the burden. In Japanese panel data, the gains of becoming a manager are hard to see. Sato (2022, working paper) reported that taking a management position did not raise health or happiness for either men or women, that household income satisfaction did not change even though earnings increased, and that self-rated health worsened one to two years after promotion. He interpreted this as indicating that the monetary reward of a management position is not enough to offset the burden of the work. This analysis is not limited to playing managers.

People who have not yet been appointed also see these losses. In a tabulation by MHLW (2018), 61.1% of regular employees without a position and of chief-level employees did not want to be promoted to management; the most common reason was “the responsibility becomes heavier” (71.3%), followed by “the work to be done increases and leads to long working hours.” Among those who wanted promotion, the most common reason was “pay increases” (87.2%). Section managers themselves ranked “maintaining my current position (section manager)” first as the position they ultimately wanted, at its highest share to date (Sanno University Research Institute 2021). Only 21.0% of managers had asked to be promoted to management, and 47.1% answered that they “became one in the course of things” (NOMA 2026). The career narratives of doctors and nurses who also take managerial roles in UK health care likewise fell into three types: aspirational, ambivalent, and agnostic (Bresnen et al. 2019).

What does the appointing side gain and lose?

For the appointing side (executives, supervisors, and HR), the first gain is obtaining two capabilities from one person. Grey (2026), a former development manager, wrote that the appeal of engineering managers who code is that “you get leadership capacity and engineering capacity from a single hire,” and acknowledged that in very small organizations this is often a necessary practical compromise. One engineering manager wrote that organizations demand management capability while also demanding hands-on resources, and that managers often take on hands-on work to fill the gap until new staff are hired (kenichit 2023). Suzuki (2025) of Kaminashi positioned the playing manager as a type of engineering manager to be practiced deliberately and selectively, and as a form that embodies ownership of responsibilities.

The second gain is fewer layers. The executives’ letters state that removing layers makes decisions and information flow faster (Zuckerberg 2023; Armstrong 2026), reduces overhead and bureaucracy (Jassy 2024; Tan 2025), and lowers costs (Armstrong 2026). These are statements of executive intent, not measurements of effects.

The third gain is the effect of technically competent bosses on subordinates. Artz et al. (2017) showed, with data on US and British workers, that a boss’s technical competence (whether the supervisor worked his or her way up inside the company, whether the supervisor could do the worker’s job, and ratings of the supervisor’s competence) is the single strongest predictor of a worker’s job satisfaction. Even for workers who stayed in the same job and workplace, a rise in the competence of the supervisor was associated with an improvement in the worker’s wellbeing (longitudinal data with fixed effects). Google’s Project Oxygen lists “have key technical skills” as one of ten behaviors of good managers (Google re:Work n.d.). Gittell (2001, abstract) showed, in airline flight departures, that supervisors with smaller spans achieved higher relational coordination among their direct reports and better performance, and reported from qualitative data that these supervisors achieved this by working with their direct reports and providing intensive coaching and feedback.

The fourth gain is team outcomes. Recruit Works Institute (2020) compared a team outcome index answered by the managers themselves (the average of 15 items on team performance, productivity, subordinates’ growth, and other matters, on a scale of 1 to 5) across shares of player work. Section managers with a share of 20 to 30% scored highest at 3.27, above the 3.08 of section managers who did no player work. The report states that playing managers cannot be lumped together as unable to raise team outcomes.

The first loss is that subordinates do not develop. The most common worry of section managers was “subordinates do not develop easily” consistently across the four surveys from 2012 to 2019 (37.4% in 2019; Sanno University Research Institute 2018, 2019), and the same was true for department managers (39.5% in 2021; Sanno University Research Institute 2022). In a survey of HR staff, 71% of companies that reported increased managerial burden as a problem answered that managers could no longer spend time on developing and motivating subordinates (HR Soken 2026). Takeda (2023), who moved from data scientist to manager, wrote that the harm of player work ends with the team’s performance being confined to the capability of the individual manager.

The second loss is that outcomes fall when the share of player work is high. In the same figure in Recruit Works Institute (2020), the outcome index declines almost steadily as the share rises and is lowest at 2.86 for section managers with 80% or more. The degree to which management work was carried out dropped sharply at a share of 30% or more, and the difference between those below and above 30% was statistically significant. In Gallup (2026a), managers who spent less than 40% of their time on individual contributor work tended to maintain higher engagement than the average (37%) regardless of team size, whereas those above 40% had lower engagement, and the gap widened with the number of direct reports (a regression controlling for age, gender, length of service in role, and industry). The two surveys measured different targets (the former, self-rated team outcomes; the latter, the manager’s own engagement). Both are cross-sectional associations and do not show the effect of changing the share.

The third loss is the cost of making the best players into managers. Benson et al. (2019, abstract) showed, with data on sales workers at 131 firms, results consistent with the Peter Principle: firms place heavy weight on current job performance in promotion decisions, although other characteristics better predict managerial performance. The authors estimated that the cost of promoting workers with lower managerial potential is high, and suggested that the practice may persist because the incentive benefits of promotion outweigh this cost. Lazear (2004, abstract) argued that the apparent decline in ability after promotion is a statistical consequence of regression to the mean. In a software development organization, both developers and managers answered that technical skills are not the sign of a great engineering manager (Kalliamvakou et al. 2019, abstract). Read together with the findings on bosses’ technical competence by Artz et al., expertise is a basis for subordinates’ satisfaction, but selecting managers by expertise does not necessarily result in good managers.

The fourth loss is that people management skills are neither measured nor developed. Hoffman and Tadelis (2021) showed, with personnel data from a large high-tech firm, that managers with higher survey-measured people management skills had less employee turnover and themselves received higher performance ratings, promotions, and salary increases. In a survey by the Chartered Management Institute (CMI 2023), 82% of people who become managers had no formal training, and 50% of those who described their line manager as ineffective were planning to leave within 12 months (21% of those who described their manager as effective). Companies also ranked the uneven ability and qualities of management candidates as their top issue in appointing and developing managers (49.1%; MHLW 2018).

The fifth loss is a vacuum in management work. Kippist and Fitzgerald (2009) stated, from interviews and observations of 14 hybrid clinician managers in an Australian hospital, that they constantly negotiate between the two roles, and argued that choosing the clinical role over the managerial role leaves the managerial functions in a vacuum and leads to conflict within the organization. Grey (2026) also wrote that neither the management work nor the engineering work receives the attention it deserves and that the team pays the price. Suzuki (2025) listed the risks of the playing manager becoming a workaholic and becoming a single point of failure.

The sixth loss is that there may be no next generation of managers. MHLW (2018) described the increase in managers’ workload and the increase in young people who do not want to become managers as issues common to companies, and wrote that the former is considered to lead to the latter. This is the view of the white paper and not a test of causality.

Where do academic and industry sources agree and diverge?

The two sides agree that the combined role makes time and attention compete, and that in this competition management work is cut first. In academic research, hybrid clinician managers who choose the clinical role leave management functions in a vacuum (Kippist and Fitzgerald 2009); in industry, 60% of section managers report that player work hinders management (Sanno University Research Institute 2019), and practitioners describe tech lead managers who forget the management part (Larson 2020). The two sides also point in the same direction in suggesting that the share of hands-on work has an upper limit. In industry surveys, outcomes or engagement fall beyond a share of around 30% (Recruit Works Institute 2020) or 40% (Gallup 2026a), and in academic research, the effect of supervisors who work with their subordinates appeared when the span of supervision was small (Gittell 2001).

The two sides diverge in what they use as the unit of measurement. Industry measures the share of time and the manager’s own sense of burden, whereas academia measures the structure of the role (a supervisory core with additional responsibilities, a mix of professional and managerial work) and its consequences for subordinates and organizations (satisfaction, turnover, and subordinates’ performance). As a result, the relationship between the share of player work and team outcomes exists only in cross-sectional industry surveys and was not found in peer-reviewed research. Conversely, the cost of how promotions are decided (Benson et al. 2019) and the effects of bosses’ competence (Artz et al. 2017) were measured by academic researchers with company records and longitudinal data, and industry surveys have no corresponding figures.

The two sides also diverge in whose gains and losses they describe. Executives’ letters describe the gains for the appointing side (speed, cost, and less bureaucracy), whereas practitioners’ blogs and talks describe the losses for the appointee (decaying skills, retreat to familiar work, and workaholism). Academic research differs from both and measures, as a third party, the consequences for subordinates and organizations and the health of the managers themselves. On how to combine the roles, practitioners such as Majors recommend moving between engineering and management in turn, and practitioners such as Suzuki recommend choosing the combined role for a limited time, whereas executive policies such as Coinbase’s require both at once.

Where do the differences come from?

The differences come from what each source must explain, and to whom. This is the interpretation of this note. Many of the surveys by Japanese research firms, institutes, and industry associations need to show the current state of section managers, and possible measures, to the HR departments of companies, which are the counterparts of their training and HR businesses. They therefore ask section managers about their allocation of time and their worries, and they present target shares. The US executives’ letters need to give employees and shareholders reasons for changing the organization. They therefore give speed and cost as the reasons. Academic research needs to let readers who were not present verify causal claims. It therefore measures promotion, bosses’ competence, and subordinates’ outcomes with company records and longitudinal data, and it decomposes the workplace term “playing manager” into the concepts of supervision, role, and expertise without using the term itself.

This way of decomposing the subject also overlaps with differences between Japanese and Anglo-American managers. Many Japanese managers see themselves as one of the employees and work in ways similar to their subordinates (Kume and Nakamura 2020). Whereas English-language research separates first-line supervisors from managers and sees hybrids that combine professional work among managers, Japanese section managers are classified as managerial occupations but often work in the way the ILO describes supervisors³. The need in Japan for the single word “playing manager” can be read as a result of the gap between the status of a manager and the content of supervisory work.

What this investigation can and cannot say

This investigation supports the following points. Almost all Japanese section managers also do hands-on work, and the share has not changed greatly across the surveys from at least 2010 to 2021. The recent “trend” is, in Japan, a trend in the name for a long-standing condition and, in US technology firms, a trend in policies for removing management layers. The appointee gains continued involvement in hands-on work and pay, loses time and room to learn, and finds skills hard to maintain. The appointing side gains two capabilities from one person and fewer layers, and takes on the risk of losing the development of subordinates and the next generation of managers. Academic and industry sources agree that the combined role makes time and attention compete and that management work is cut first.

Much remains outside what this investigation can say. The relationship between the share of hands-on work and team outcomes or engagement is an association in cross-sectional industry surveys, not the effect of changing the share. The outcomes in Recruit Works Institute (2020) are the managers’ own answers, not outcomes rated by subordinates or taken from records. Day et al. (2004) studied sports, Gittell (2001) studied airline flight departures, and Hutchinson and Purcell (2010) and Kippist and Fitzgerald (2009) studied cases in health care, so their results do not necessarily apply directly to section managers in ordinary firms. Sato (2022) and Fletcher and French (2021) analyzed promotion to management in general and are not limited to playing managers. The Japanese studies whose titles address the stress of playing managers (Fukuzawa and Iwata 2015; Nishimura 2014) could not be obtained in full text, and their content could not be confirmed. The US executives’ letters are statements of intent, and in the collection for this note no evaluation was found of how removing layers affected speed or cost. Reported figures suggesting that the removal of management layers appears as layoffs of middle managers or declines in job postings (Live Data Technologies, Revelio Labs) could not be traced to first-hand analyses and are not used in this note.

Related notes

• Why Is the Stress of Outperformers Hard to Voice? Evidence on Displaying Competence, Being Envied, Hiding Success, and Invisible Effort: academic literature on how work and expectations concentrate on highly capable people and how this makes the burden hard to talk about

Unverified items

No unverified statement remains in the main claims. The full texts of the following papers could not be obtained (many publishers and institutional repositories refused automated retrieval). These papers were therefore used only within the scope of their abstracts: Allen and Katz (1986), Benson et al. (2019, the peer-reviewed version; the full text of the working paper version was obtained, but because figures differ between versions, the claims are limited to the abstract of the peer-reviewed version), Day et al. (2004), Fletcher and French (2021), Gittell (2001), Hales (2005), Hutchinson and Purcell (2010), Kalliamvakou et al. (2019), Lazear (2004; the full text of the working paper version was obtained), Littler et al. (2003), McCann et al. (2008), McGivern et al. (2015), Noordegraaf (2007), and Rajan and Wulf (2006; the full text of the working paper version was obtained). For Fukuzawa and Iwata (2015) and Nishimura (2014), the repository was under maintenance or no location of the full text was recorded, so only the bibliographic records were confirmed. Sato (2022) and Hoffmann et al. (2024) are working papers and Xu et al. (2025) is a preprint, and peer-reviewed versions could not be confirmed. For the Coinbase letter (Armstrong 2026), the original post on X could not be obtained, and the text was checked on a copy.

References

All sources were accessed on 2026-11-01. The ledgers and verification records are in papers.md and industry.md under source/review/playing-manager/.

Academic

• Allen, Thomas J., and Ralph Katz. 1986. “The Dual Ladder: Motivational Solution or Managerial Delusion?” R&D Management 16 (2): 185–197. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.1986.tb01171.x
• Artz, Benjamin, Amanda H. Goodall, and Andrew J. Oswald. 2017. “Boss Competence and Worker Well-Being.” ILR Review 70 (2): 419–450. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793916650451
• Benson, Alan, Danielle Li, and Kelly Shue. 2019. “Promotions and the Peter Principle.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 134 (4): 2085–2134. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz022
• Bloom, Nicholas, Luis Garicano, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen. 2014. “The Distinct Effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization.” Management Science 60 (12): 2859–2885. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2013
• Bresnen, Mike, Damian Hodgson, Simon Bailey, John Hassard, and Paula Hyde. 2019. “Hybrid Managers, Career Narratives and Identity Work: A Contextual Analysis of UK Healthcare Organizations.” Human Relations 72 (8): 1341–1368. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726718807280
• Day, David V., Hock-Peng Sin, and Tina T. Chen. 2004. “Assessing the Burdens of Leadership: Effects of Formal Leadership Roles on Individual Performance Over Time.” Personnel Psychology 57 (3): 573–605. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2004.00001.x
• Fletcher, Luke, and Kimberly A. French. 2021. “Longitudinal Effects of Transitioning into a First-Time Leadership Position on Wellbeing and Self-Concept.” Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 26 (6): 469–490. https://doi.org/10.1037/ocp0000302
• Fukuzawa [福澤菜恵], and Iwata [岩田一哲]. 2015. “An Empirical Research on Stress of Playing Manager: Focus on Middle Manager” [プレイング・マネジャーのストレスに関する実証調査：ミドル・マネジャーを中心に]. Jinbun Shakai Ronso, Shakai Kagaku Hen 33: 145–166 (Hirosaki University; full text not confirmed; in Japanese). https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1050001202538594176
• Gittell, Jody Hoffer. 2001. “Supervisory Span, Relational Coordination and Flight Departure Performance: A Reassessment of Postbureaucracy Theory.” Organization Science 12 (4): 468–483. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.12.4.468.10636
• Hales, Colin. 2005. “Rooted in Supervision, Branching into Management: Continuity and Change in the Role of First-Line Manager.” Journal of Management Studies 42 (3): 471–506. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00506.x
• Hoffman, Mitchell, and Steven Tadelis. 2021. “People Management Skills, Employee Attrition, and Manager Rewards: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 129 (1): 243–285. https://doi.org/10.1086/711409
• Hoffmann, Manuel, Sam Boysel, Frank Nagle, Sida Peng, and Kevin Xu. 2024. “Generative AI and the Nature of Work.” CESifo Working Paper No. 11479 (working paper). https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp11479.pdf
• Hutchinson, Sue, and John Purcell. 2010. “Managing Ward Managers for Roles in HRM in the NHS: Overworked and Under-Resourced.” Human Resource Management Journal 20 (4): 357–374. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-8583.2010.00141.x
• Iwata [岩田一哲]. 2015. “Factors Leading to Stress among Middle Managers: In Relation to Overwork Suicide” [中間管理職のストレスを導く要因：過労自殺との関係から]. Keieigaku Ronshu 85: F24-1–F24-3 (abstract of a presentation at the 88th Annual Meeting of the Japan Society of Business Administration; in Japanese). https://doi.org/10.24472/abjaba.85.0_F24-1
• Kalliamvakou, Eirini, Christian Bird, Thomas Zimmermann, Andrew Begel, Robert DeLine, and Daniel M. German. 2019. “What Makes a Great Manager of Software Engineers?” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 45 (1): 87–106. https://doi.org/10.1109/tse.2017.2768368
• Kippist, Louise, and Anneke Fitzgerald. 2009. “Organisational Professional Conflict and Hybrid Clinician Managers: The Effects of Dual Roles in Australian Health Care Organisations.” Journal of Health Organization and Management 23 (6): 642–655. https://doi.org/10.1108/14777260911001653
• Kume [久米功一], and Nakamura [中村天江]. 2020. “How Managers Work in Japan, the United States, and China: Implications for Japanese Companies Aiming at Job-Based Employment” [日・米・中の管理職の働き方：ジョブ型雇用を目指す日本企業への示唆]. Japanese Journal of Labour Studies 725: 19–30 (in Japanese). https://www.jil.go.jp/institute/zassi/backnumber/2020/12/pdf/019-030.pdf
• Lazear, Edward P. 2004. “The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (S1): S141–S163. https://doi.org/10.1086/379943
• Littler, Craig R., Retha Wiesner, and Richard Dunford. 2003. “The Dynamics of Delayering: Changing Management Structures in Three Countries.” Journal of Management Studies 40 (2): 225–256. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00339
• McCann, Leo, Jonathan Morris, and John Hassard. 2008. “Normalized Intensity: The New Labour Process of Middle Management.” Journal of Management Studies 45 (2): 343–371. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00762.x
• McGivern, Gerry, Graeme Currie, Ewan Ferlie, Louise Fitzgerald, and Justin Waring. 2015. “Hybrid Manager–Professionals’ Identity Work: The Maintenance and Hybridization of Medical Professionalism in Managerial Contexts.” Public Administration 93 (2): 412–432. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12119
• Nishimura [西村文元]. 2014. “Does Distributed Management Contribute to Reducing the Burden on Middle Managers Who Have Become Playing Managers?” [分散マネジメントはプレイングマネージャー化したミドルマネージャーの負荷軽減に寄与するか]. Shodai Business Review 4 (1): 117–152 (full text not confirmed; in Japanese). https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1520572360217033600
• Noordegraaf, Mirko. 2007. “From ‘Pure’ to ‘Hybrid’ Professionalism.” Administration & Society 39 (6): 761–785. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399707304434
• Rajan, Raghuram G., and Julie Wulf. 2006. “The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies.” Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (4): 759–773. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.88.4.759
• Sakazume [坂爪洋美]. 2020. “Changes in the Role of Managers and Their Challenges: A Literature Review” [管理職の役割の変化とその課題：文献レビューによる検討]. Japanese Journal of Labour Studies 725: 4–18 (in Japanese). https://www.jil.go.jp/institute/zassi/backnumber/2020/12/pdf/004-018.pdf
• Sato, Kazuma. 2022. “How Does Working in the Management Position Affect Health and Subjective Well-Being?: Evidence from Japan.” PDRC Discussion Paper DP2022-002, Keio University (working paper). https://www.pdrc.keio.ac.jp/uploads/DP2022-002_en.pdf
• Shiraishi [白石久喜]. 2008. “Redesigning the Role of Middle Managers: Resolving Role Conflict and Essentials of Role Division” [ミドルマネジャーの役割再設計：役割コンフリクトの解消と役割分割の要諦]. Works Review 3: 74–87 (Recruit Works Institute; in Japanese). https://doi.org/10.34391/worksrev.3.6_1
• Xu, Fasheng, Jing Hou, Wei Chen, and Karen Xie. 2025. “Generative AI and Organizational Structure in the Knowledge Economy.” arXiv:2506.00532 (preprint, v2 2026-03-24). https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.00532

Public bodies and international standards

• BLS (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). 2018. “2018 Standard Occupational Classification System: Major Groups.” https://www.bls.gov/soc/2018/major_groups.htm
• Ikezoe [池添弘邦], Takami [高見具広], and Ishii [石井華絵]. 2022. Results of Hearings with Managers: How Managers Work and Manage Their Workplaces [管理職ヒアリング調査結果：管理職の働き方と職場マネジメント]. JILPT Research Material Series No. 254. Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (in Japanese). https://www.jil.go.jp/institute/siryo/2022/documents/0254.pdf
• ILO (International Labour Organization). 2023. The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) Companion Guide, Version 1.0. https://www.ilo.org/media/360471/download
• JILPT (Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training). 2021. Survey on How Managers Work [管理職の働き方に関する調査]. JILPT Research Series No. 212 (in Japanese). https://www.jil.go.jp/institute/research/2021/documents/212.pdf
• JILPT. 2022a. Results of a Survey on Workers’ Work and Health and Managers’ Workplace Management [働く人の仕事と健康、管理職の職場マネジメントに関する調査結果]. JILPT Research Series No. 222 (in Japanese). https://www.jil.go.jp/institute/research/2022/222.html
• JILPT. 2022b. Research on Working Hours: Analysis of an Individual Survey [労働時間の研究：個人調査結果の分析]. JILPT Research Report No. 217 (in Japanese). https://www.jil.go.jp/institute/reports/2022/0217.html
• JILPT. 2026. “Employed Persons by Occupation (2025 Average)” [職業別就業者数（2025年平均）]. Graphs on Current Labour Conditions (in Japanese). https://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/chart/pdf/25g0006.pdf
• MHLW (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). 2018. White Paper on the Labour Economy 2018 [平成30年版 労働経済の分析], Part 2, Chapter 3 (Figures 2-(3)-26 to 2-(3)-29) (in Japanese). https://www.mhlw.go.jp/wp/hakusyo/roudou/18/dl/18-1-2-3_03.pdf
• MHLW. 2026. Overview of the 2025 Basic Survey on Wage Structure [令和7年賃金構造基本統計調査 結果の概況], Table 8, Wages by Position (in Japanese). https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/itiran/roudou/chingin/kouzou/z2025/dl/08.pdf
• MIC (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). 2009. Japan Standard Occupational Classification [日本標準職業分類（平成21年12月統計基準設定）] (in Japanese). https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000661290.pdf
• ONS (Office for National Statistics). 2022. “Job Quality in the UK: Analysis of Job Quality Indicators” (2021 data, released 2022-12-16). https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/articles/jobqualityindicatorsintheukhourspayandcontracts/2021

Research firms, think tanks, and the institutes of human resource companies

• CMI (Chartered Management Institute). 2023. Taking Responsibility: Why UK PLC Needs Better Managers. https://www.managers.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CMI_BMB_GoodManagment_Report.pdf
• Gallup. 2026a. “Span of Control: What’s the Optimal Team Size for Managers?” https://www.gallup.com/workplace/700718/span-control-optimal-team-size-managers.aspx
• Gallup. 2026b. State of the Global Workplace 2026. https://www.gallup.com/workplace/349484/state-of-the-global-workplace.aspx
• HR Soken. 2026. “Report on the Questionnaire on Reducing Managers’ Burden and Changes in Their Roles” [管理職の負担軽減・役割変化に関するアンケート 結果報告] (in Japanese). https://www.hrpro.co.jp/research_detail.php?r_no=424
• JMA Management Center (JMAM). 2019. “JMAM Survey on Managers 2018” [JMAM 管理者実態調査 2018] (in Japanese). https://digitalpr.jp/pdf.php?r=31225
• NOMA (Nippon Omni-Management Association). 2026. “Is Being a Manager Really a Punishment? Reading the Reality of Busy Middle Managers, Nearly 90% of Whom Also Do Hands-On Work” [管理職は本当に罰ゲーム？ 約 9 割が現場の実務も担うプレイングマネジャー、多忙な中間管理職の実態を読み解く] (press release via PR TIMES on the 8th White Paper on Middle Managers in Japan; in Japanese). https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000362.000078820.html
• Persol Research and Consulting. 2019. “Quantitative Survey on the Work Burden of Middle Managers” [中間管理職の就業負担に関する定量調査] (in Japanese). https://rc.persol-group.co.jp/thinktank/data/middle-management.html
• Recruit Management Solutions. 2014. “70% of Managers Also Do Player Work” [7 割のマネジャーがプレイング業務を兼務] (press release via Kyodo News PR Wire; in Japanese). https://kyodonewsprwire.jp/release/201409243952
• Recruit Works Institute. 2020. The Age of Playing Managers [プレイングマネジャーの時代]. Works Report 2020 (in Japanese). https://www.works-i.com/research/report/item/pmgrjobassign2020.pdf
• Sanno University Research Institute. 2018. “The 4th Survey of Section Managers at Listed Companies” [第4回 上場企業の課長に関する実態調査] (in Japanese). https://www.sanno.ac.jp/admin/research/fm3fav0000000qy6-att/kachou2018.pdf
• Sanno University Research Institute. 2019. “The 5th Survey of Section Managers at Listed Companies” [第5回 上場企業の課長に関する実態調査] (in Japanese). https://www.sanno.ac.jp/admin/research/f0krqt0000000d9g-att/kachou2019.pdf
• Sanno University Research Institute. 2021. “The 6th Survey of Section Managers at Listed Companies” [第6回 上場企業の課長に関する実態調査] (in Japanese). https://www.sanno.ac.jp/admin/research/kachou2021.html
• Sanno University Research Institute. 2022. “The 2nd Survey of Department Managers at Listed Companies” [第2回 上場企業の部長に関する実態調査] (in Japanese). https://www.sanno.ac.jp/admin/research/rtb6hq00000000iv-att/202202buchou.pdf
• Sanno University Research Institute and HR Soken. 2023. “Results of the Survey on HR Practices for Middle Managers 2023” [ミドルマネジャーの人事実態調査 2023] (press release via Kyodo News PR Wire; in Japanese). https://kyodonewsprwire.jp/release/202309129480

First-hand statements by executives and practitioners, and reports

• Armstrong, Brian. 2026. Letter to all employees (May 5, 2026; copy of a post on X). https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/2051616759145185723.html
• Dorsey, Jack. 2026. “Jack Dorsey: Every Company Can Now Be a Mini-AGI.” Sequoia Capital (podcast transcript). https://sequoiacap.com/podcast/jack-dorsey-every-company-can-now-be-a-mini-agi
• Elias, Jennifer. 2025. “Google Has Eliminated 35% of Managers Overseeing Small Teams in Past Year, Exec Says.” CNBC, August 27, 2025. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/27/google-executive-says-company-has-cut-a-third-of-its-managers.html
• Google re:Work. n.d. “Following the Data: The Research Behind Great Managers.” https://rework.withgoogle.com/intl/en/guides/following-the-data-the-research-behind-great-managers
• Grey, Jim. 2026. “The Player/Coach Trap: Why Engineering Managers Shouldn’t Be Expected to Code.” https://dev.jimgrey.net/2026/03/25/the-player-coach-trap-why-engineering-managers-shouldnt-be-expected-to-code/
• Jassy, Andy. 2024. “Update from Amazon CEO Andy Jassy on Return-to-Office Plans and Manager Team Ratio.” Amazon. https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/ceo-andy-jassy-latest-update-on-amazon-return-to-office-manager-team-ratio
• Jassy, Andy. 2025. “Amazon CEO Andy Jassy’s 2024 Letter to Shareholders.” Amazon. https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/amazon-ceo-andy-jassy-2024-letter-to-shareholders
• kenichit. 2023. “The Merits and Demerits of Playing Managers: The Management Dilemma Engineers Face” [プレイングマネージャーの功罪：エンジニアが直面するマネジメントのジレンマ]. note (in Japanese). https://note.com/kenichit/n/n14bf5d821622
• Kua, Patrick. 2015. “From Developer to Tech Lead” (interview). Glitch Blog. https://blog.glitch.com/post/from-developer-to-tech-lead
• Larson, Will. 2020. “Tech Lead Management Roles Are a Trap.” https://lethain.com/tech-lead-managers/
• Majors, Charity. 2017. “The Engineer/Manager Pendulum.” https://charity.wtf/2017/05/11/the-engineer-manager-pendulum/
• Nusca, Andrew. 2026. “The Rise of the Silicon Valley Player-Coach.” Fortune, May 6, 2026. https://fortune.com/2026/05/06/the-rise-of-the-silicon-valley-player-coach/
• Suzuki [鈴木健太郎]. 2025. “Re-thinking the Accountability of Playing Manager” [プレイングマネージャーは本当に悪なのか？ 令和時代のプレイングマネージャーを戦略的にハックする]. EMConf JP 2025 (slides; in Japanese). https://speakerdeck.com/kaminashi/re-thinking-the-accountability-of-playing-manager
• Takeda [武田邦敬]. 2023. “Small Measures for Moving Beyond Being a Playing Manager (for Technical Managers)” [プレイングマネジャーを脱するための小さな工夫（技術系マネジャーへ）]. note (in Japanese). https://note.com/ku2t/n/n9d54a9d3571c
• Tan, Lip-Bu. 2025. “Lip-Bu Tan: Our Path Forward.” Intel. https://www.intc.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1738/lip-bu-tan-our-path-forward
• Zuckerberg, Mark. 2023. “Update on Meta’s Year of Efficiency.” Meta. https://about.fb.com/news/2023/03/mark-zuckerberg-meta-year-of-efficiency/

Footnotes

1. The US occupational classification excludes team or work leaders from first-line supervisors (BLS 2018). The Japanese term for “manager” also refers to different things in different sources. In the Japan Standard Occupational Classification, managerial workers are those engaged in managing organizations at the level of a section (or equivalent) or above, and chiefs and team leaders below that level are not included (MIC 2009). The JILPT (2021) survey of managers is limited to managers who are not eligible for overtime premiums. ↩

2. The share of managers combining the roles refers to section managers whose share of work as a player is not 0% in the Sanno University surveys, section-manager-equivalent employees who do “the same work that subordinates do” in Recruit Works Institute (2020), line managers from section manager to department manager in NOMA (2026; the definition is not given in the press release), and section-manager-equivalent employees in companies with 1,000 or more employees in Recruit Management Solutions (2014), so changes cannot be read across these figures. In a survey of HR staff, only 2.1% of companies answered that the roles of player and manager were separated and that managers could concentrate on management (Sanno University Research Institute and HR Soken 2023). ↩

3. Managerial workers in the Labour Force Survey numbered 1.25 million in the 2025 average, or 1.8% of employed persons (JILPT 2026), which does not correspond to the number of department and section managers. The reading that many Japanese section managers are close to what the ILO calls supervisors is the interpretation of this note, not a statement by the ILO. ↩